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Abstract 
  
 This paper analyzes the state of Middle East Track-II projects since the 1990s, the failure 
of the ACRS working group, and how a better understanding of security norms and public 
opinion can improve Track-II collaboration and produce long-term results.  The first section of 
the paper provides a summary of NGO activities, and how their work relates to the development 
of a regional security regime.  The projects featured in this paper are by no means exhaustive, 
but are intended to represent the variety of forms and objectives Track-II efforts have 
traditionally taken in the region.  The second section provides a review of perspectives on 
international norm diffusion and the influence of public opinion on policymaking.  Building on 
this foundation, the third section provides an outline of the goals, structure and composition of an 
unofficial regional security coalition between NGO partners in the Middle East. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper is an attempt to address shortcomings in existing Middle East security regime 
literature by providing a short-term recommendation for how to influence the long-term future of 
Middle East security.  The primary components of the paper include a concise review of notable 
NGO activities in the Middle East since the early nineties, an analysis of prominent perspectives 
on security regime development, international norm development and diffusion, and the 
relationship between public opinion and policymaking.  From this foundation, the last section of 
the paper outlines the goals, structure, and composition of an unofficial NGO coalition for the 
Middle East, including a consideration of the barriers to developing such a coalition.   
Through this approach to Middle East security and diplomacy, I hope to get around some 
of the recurring hurdles common to discussions of the Middle East, both in the media and 
academia.  For example, consider a recent publication from the James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, “Seizing the Opportunity to Create a WMD-free Middle East.”1  The 
article hails an upcoming conference in Finland as a possible “cornerstone for a new regional 
security architecture” for the Middle East.  The path to success through this official forum is 
supposed to be simple: first, participation from every state in the region must be secured, 
including that of Iran and Israel; second, all participants must demonstrate a readiness to 
compromise on reasonable guidelines for regional cooperation; finally, extra-regional sponsor 
states (the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom) must demonstrate a commitment to 
the principles a goals developed by the regional participants.  Summits of this sort are not 
unique.  Time and again governments agree to meet, with varying degrees of regional inclusivity, 
                                                          
1
 Tamim Khallaf (2012). “Seizing the Opportunity to Create a WMD-free Middle East” found online at 
http://cns.miis.edu/wmdjunction/120417_mideast_wmdfz.htm last accessed May 18, 2012 
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and they stumble over the same issues in each instance.  The cycle continues.  Governments 
meet, disagree on guiding principles, and progress fades.   
 
Figure 1 is a simplified representation of the interactions between various official and 
unofficial institutions under the status quo.  The three governments portrayed above interact with 
elite members of the public, identified above as business elites, social elites (this may include 
religious leaders or media figures), and interest groups (including the “attentive public” which 
will be examined later).  In this model, NGOs and the track II projects they sponsor have little 
room for influence.  In some cases they are permitted to interact with government officials, or 
they sponsor public engagement programs, but in both cases they operate in isolation from other 
NGOs, and so have only a limited sphere of influence.  On the periphery are the regional publics, 
informed exclusively by media inputs with little or no recourse for policy engagement.  Note that 
Figure1: Regional relations under status 
quo 
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media entities are highly influenced and controlled by governments.  As a simplified model there 
are of course exceptions, but as a portrayal of security relations in the Middle East, this provides 
a useful visualization of the last few decades of security negotiations. 
Official approaches under the status quo, in the framework illustrated in figure 1, fail for 
two reasons not usually addressed by contributors to security policy literature.  First, before 
progressive concessions can occur, and guiding principles for a regional security regime can be 
agreed upon, there must be a unified, normative foundation in the region.  States must agree on 
certain norms of military and diplomatic behavior.  These norms need not be as deeply rooted as 
they are, for example, among European states, but they must at least be widely accepted in the 
region.  Secondly, regional publics are often opposed to dramatic changes in security relations 
between adversarial governments; most notably consider Israel, Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Iran.  
To illustrate this point, at points later in the paper I discuss examples from both the failure of 
talks sponsored by the Search for Common Ground in 1993, and later, the failure of Camp David 
talks in 2000.   
By describing a NGO coalition model for the Middle East, this paper attempts to provide 
a possible solution to both the norms and public opinion barriers by turning to regional NGOs 
and the potential for expanding and integrating track II projects.  Before exploring details of an 
NGO coalition in the Middle East, consider the following example from the Asia Pacific region.  
The Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is a network of security 
institutes who help structure and guide a regional discourse on security policy.
2
  The Council was 
founded in 1993 after a meeting of two dozen security institutes from ten countries (Australia, 
Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
                                                          
2
 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. 2012, last accessed May 1, 2012 <www.cscap.org>. 
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USA) determined that a coordinated effort would provide a useful perspective on the security-
related proceedings of ASEAN.  The CSCAP attends to a variety of issue areas, including 
CSBM, comprehensive and cooperative security, transnational crime, maritime security 
cooperation, and preventive diplomacy.  Four working groups are currently operating under the 
CSCAP: Cybersecurity as a central strategy for securing the cyber environment in the Asia 
Pacific region, water resources in mainland Southeast Asia, multilateral security governance in 
Northeast Asia/North Pacific, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in 
the Asia Pacific.  The existence and success of the CSCAP is a hopeful sign for developing a 
similar organization in the Middle East, however the existing organization and the proposal for 
the Middle East differ in one important way.  The unofficial network of NGOs in East Asia was 
founded in the wake of ASEAN, a stable and effective official regime.  This ordering of events 
has an effect on the activities of the NGO coalition by way of the level of support received from 
host governments.  The CSCAP is intended to augment the ongoing work of government 
collaboration, whereas in the Middle East, the NGO coalition would spend considerable time 
working to create government collaboration, in the hope of someday establishing an organization 
similar to ASEAN.  The lesson of the CSCAP is that an NGO coalition can work, but it should 
be understood that the task in the Middle East will be more challenging.  Consider figure 2 for a 
visualization of how an NGO coalition can successfully overlay with government, media, and 
public relations in a region. 
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Figure 2 provides a visualization of regional relations with the development of an 
unofficial NGO coalition.  First, it should be noted that the increased number of track II projects 
in figure 2 compared to figure 1 is not necessarily an increase in the number of NGOs operating 
in the region, but is instead intended to illustrate the sustained presence of track II projects that 
are integrated in the coalition.  As I will discuss later, one of the greatest failings of current NGO 
projects is the inability to sustain a given project beyond a handful of meetings and, in some 
cases, a single publication.  The advantage of the integrated track II approach is the ability to 
create a sustained regional presence through coordination between coalition participants and the 
sharing of resources.  Figure 2 shows a selection of possible types of engagement offered by 
existing track II projects, each of which are strengthened by participation in the coalition.  Some 
projects focus specifically on public engagement, others work to provide a forum for regional 
Figure 2: regional relations with 
integrated track II coalition 
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dialogue between government and NGO representatives.  Perhaps most importantly is the 
increases communication with regional media outlets provided by the collaborative efforts of the 
coalition.  The thickness of the arrows in figure 2 indicates the differences in influence and 
media saturation that can be achieved by governments as compared to NGOs.  A comparison of 
figures 1 and 2 shows the intended effect of the track II coalition proposal.   
When track-II projects in the Middle East have occurred over the last two decades they 
function almost identically as their official counterparts, especially in cases where government 
representatives are present.  Because they operate the same way, these projects are vulnerable to 
the same weaknesses inherent in government relations.  State interests and entrenched rhetoric 
keep governments in the Middle East apart.  Track-II programs ought the be able to capitalize 
more effectively on what makes them fundamentally different from official government 
programs; NGOs are not restricted by state interests, their current operations show a willingness 
to engage across the region, and their work makes an effort to transcend debilitating state 
rhetoric.  In order to better realize the potential of these attributes it is necessary to forge a 
coalition of NGO partners that is regionally inclusive and that can lay a foundation for a future of 
stable government relations.  In examining the existing work on regime theory, norm diffusion, 
and public opinion, the remainder of the paper discusses how the coalition ought to operate (as 
depicted in figure 2) and what NGO cooperation stands to achieve. 
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Part I: Review of NGO Involvement in the Middle East 
 
What are Track-II Negotiations? 
 
Track-II negotiations, track-II diplomacy, or citizens’ diplomacy describe activities in 
which nongovernmental organizations (NGO) engage in dialogue to address policy issues 
traditionally reserved for governments.  In contrast, track-I negotiations are those between 
official government representatives.  Three stages exist in the track-II process: socialization, 
filtering, and policy realization.
3
  In the first stage, the typically small group of participants in 
track-II dialogues, involving primarily individuals affiliated with NGOs, but sometimes 
including government elites acting in an unofficial capacity, begins discussing a specific policy 
issue.  If the dialogue is successful, a sort of group socialization occurs in which direct 
participants in the dialogue are more supportive of the conclusive recommendation than their 
counterparts who did not participate.  The second stage, the filtering process, involves the 
translation of policy recommendations to the outside world.  Typically this involves participants 
returning to their respective countries and working with government officials to build consensus 
in support of the track-II recommendation.  The final stage, which is often not achieved, is the 
successful enactment of the policy recommended by the track-II participants. 
 The remainder of this section reviews some of the most notable track-II activities in the 
Middle East since the early 1990s.  With the end of the Madrid peace process, and later the 
collapse of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, a variety of 
unofficial educational projects, conferences and summits were sponsored by newly formed 
                                                          
3
 Dalia Dassa Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: TrackTwo Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007) xii  
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organizations and coalitions.  Although many of these efforts operated independently from each 
other, with differing missions, funding sources, and participants, the overarching motivations 
were often similar; in the absence of official dialogue, it was vital to maintain communications 
between policymakers and other elites in the region in order to keep the peace process alive and 
prevent region from becoming increasingly fractured.  One of the most detailed accounts of 
Middle East Track-II efforts is presented by Dalia Dassa Kaye.  For a more exhaustive account 
of activities in the 1990s, see Michael Yaffe’s earlier publication.4 
 Track-II events in the Middle East are typically in the form of unofficial diplomatic 
meetings between security elites and academics.  In some cases the purpose of the event is to 
produce a research report on specific security-related subjects.  Distribution of these reports is 
usually limited to governments, policy research institutes, and other elite stakeholders.  Although 
many participants in Track-II events acknowledge the importance of communications with the 
media about their activities, this facet of dissemination is often the most lacking, while 
potentially being most crucial.
5
  Track-II dialogues and research endeavors engage with a variety 
of subject areas relating to security studies, including, but not limited to military technology, 
military communication, economics, development, resource scarcity, and religion.  Discussion 
and analysis of each of these subjects can vary depending on the regional scope of the approach.  
Peter Jones divides track-II activities in the Middle East into three categories.
6
  First, there are 
projects that pursue sub-regional security arrangements by engaging exclusively with either Gulf 
or Mediterranean states.  Second are those seeking to establish a region-wide security regime, 
                                                          
4
 Kaye 2007; Michael D. Yaffe. 2001. “Promoting Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East,” 
Disarmament Forum, 2001; Peter Jones. “Filling a Critical Gap, or Just Wasting Time: Track Two Diplomacy and 
Regional Security in the Middle East,” Disarmament Forum, 2008. 
5
 Interview with Paul Walker (Ph.D.), August, 2011. 
6
 Peter Jones, Towards a Regional Security Regimes for the Middle East: Issues and Options, report of the SIPRI 
Middle East Expert Group (Sweden: SIPRI, 2011) 47 
14 Stewart-Smith 
 
with the potential to develop sub-regional arrangements as components of the greater whole.  
Lastly, some efforts emphasize specific security-related subjects and do not address the scope of 
geographical participation.  The case studies presented later in Part I include examples of each 
type of approach.  For the proposed track II coalition, it will be important that examples of each 
type of approach are included.  Looking back to figure 2, recall that it is valuable to include a 
diversity of approaches to regional integration; certain NGOs focusing specifically on creating 
forums for policy dialogue, while partner NGOs assist in the dissemination of information to the 
public.  Likewise is it valuable to include NGOs that operate regionally, sub-regionally, or in 
specific policy areas, as described by Jones.  Each approach has certain strengths and none 
should be ruled out at the expense of another.   
Before reviewing examples of NGO activities in the Middle East, it is worth noting that it 
can be difficult to identify specifics about the policy options under review at track-II events.   
Under the status quo, the political sensitivity of regional security is of concern for many of the 
elites who opt to participate in unofficial dialogues; information concerning the content of such 
discussion is often withheld from public scrutiny.  This information asymmetry perpetuates the 
strained relations between publics and governments, and it is among the goals of the proposed 
coalition to provide an improved filtering process in order to break the pattern of failed track II 
projects.  Of more immediate practical concern is the difficulty this presents when writing about 
track II projects.  For this reason, the featured examples emphasize the subject issues, 
composition, and funding of each project, and only in some cases provide details concerning 
security policy proposals and analysis. 
 The following examples were selected not only for their notoriety, but for the diversity of 
their approaches.  Each of the following Track-II initiatives represents an important role 
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nongovernmental organizations are able to play in the Middle East.  Many projects are of the 
traditional sort described above, involving an assembly of regional and extra-regional 
representatives who analyze security issues and develop policy recommendations.  Within this 
traditional approach there are often important variances in regional inclusion, media interaction, 
and dissemination of results.  Other approaches attempt to develop partnerships with NGOs 
expressing a common purpose in order to share in resources and to expand their influence.  Still 
others focus on the technical side of regional security.  These organizations work with regional 
leaders to facilitate either the sharing of technology or research collaboration with a design to 
build trust in the region and potentially create effective confidence and security building 
measures.  Each of the following examples illustrate drawbacks and advantages to the Track-II 
approach to regional security, and will be informative in the later discussion of a track-II regional 
coalition.   
The Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation 
 
 Following the end of the Madrid peace process, the Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation (IGCC) began hosting track-II events in the Middle East.
7
  The IGCC hosts events 
with the intention of building regional relationships between political elites.  In the Early 1990s, 
the IGCC events mirrored the activities of the multilateral peace process, and therefore addressed 
a range of topics including arms control, regional security, the environment, water scarcity, 
refugees, and economic development.
8
  Following the collapse of the ACRS working group the 
IGCC began to focus exclusively on military dialogue, including force postures, military balance 
of power, weapons effects, arms control, counter proliferation measures, military ethics, and 
                                                          
7
 University of California Institute on global Conflict and Cooperation. 2011. <http://igcc.ucsd.edu/policy/track-ii-
forums/middle-east-dialogues.htm> last viewed on March 11, 2012. 
8
 Kaye 2007. p36 
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military education.  The events with the largest scope are biannual meetings averaging 300 
participants.  These meetings draw professionals from every Middle Eastern country, Iran, 
Turkey, the United States, and a variety of European nations.  Additional meetings include those 
between exclusively active and retired military personnel.  Participants in these smaller dialogues 
include the same countries, with the exception of Iran, which has not had a military 
representative present at any of the recent meetings.  The smaller meetings focus on specific 
diplomatic and security issues, many of which involve discussions of sensitive government 
information, and therefore reports are not made publicly accessible.  The primary source of 
funding for these events historically comes from the United States and Greek governments. 
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
 
 The most relevant events hosted by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(AAAS) occurred in the early 1990s, but it should be noted that the AAAS continues to be 
involved in security dialogues in the United States, typically limited to U.S. policymakers and 
professionals.
9
  The first Middle East meeting hosted by the AAAS was in 1992.
10
  Around this 
time the AAAS also participated in joint efforts with the Foundation for International Security 
(FIS), which hosted an event in June of 1992 in Adderbury, England, and the Israel Palestine 
Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), which hosted an event in London in October 1992.  
The AAAS talks continued from 1992 to 1994 in six formal sessions.  The focus of this series of 
talks was arrival at a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis on some of their most pressing 
security issues relating to the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.  Participants in these 
                                                          
9
 The American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 2011. http://cstsp.aaas.org/event.html?bydatepast=1&s=360&np=33 
last accessed on March 12, 2012 
10
 Āghā, Ḥusayn, and Shai Feldman. Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 
2003. 
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meetings included U.S. academics, only some of whom were directly affiliated with AAAS, 
Israeli academics, a retired Israeli government official, and Palestinian security experts, 
including one PLO official.   
 This project was notable for two reasons.  Firstly, the format of the meetings allowed 
Israeli and Palestinian representatives to confer in a setting that placed their mutual security 
concerns on an equal footing.  According to Hussein Agha (Agha et. al. 2003), the AAAS talks 
were unprecedented in that they allowed Palestinian security specialists to present their views to 
a specialized Israeli and U.S. audience.  Prior to this experience, the security dialogue in the 
U.S., Europe, and Israel was dominated by an Israeli perspective on Middle Eastern security.  
This was an important opportunity to present the unique and often marginalized security 
concerns of the Palestinian leadership, given the asymmetry of power between the parties.  The 
security concerns of both parties were considered “parallel prerequisites” to any possible 
settlement concerning an Israeli withdrawal.  On the Israeli side these concerns included worries 
that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) would be unable to prevent an increase in 
military activities in the West Bank and Gaza, and that potential inter-Palestinian conflict could 
spill over into Israel.  Palestinian security concerns focused on Israeli settlements, and in the 
same vein, the potential for conservative revanchism to influence future Israeli policies toward 
Palestine. 
 The second unique characteristic of the AAAS talks, and the most important with regard 
to later sections of this essay, is the distinction between two different meeting groups within the 
single process.  This structure could be thought of as a small track-II channel within a broader, 
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more inclusive track-II forum.
11
  Besides the main six meetings, there were smaller unofficial 
meetings which did not include AAAS moderators or U.S. academics, and instead provided an 
opportunity for Israeli and Palestinian representatives to discuss and clarify issues that may have 
arisen in one of the main sessions.  Ultimately the AAAS process was overshadowed by the Oslo 
talks, and the PLO decided to minimize the potential for confusion by only participating in one 
negotiating process, and so declined to continue participating in AAAS meetings. 
The AAAS Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy 
 
 The Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy (CSTSP) works to facilitate 
communication between members of the security and science and technology fields in order to 
foster a better understanding of intentions, objectives, modes of operation, and potential 
advancements.
12
  The CSTSP is presently in the planning process for a third and fourth round of 
meetings, to be located in Tunisia and Egypt respectively, between science and technology 
experts in the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  In a recent presentation, 
Dr. Gwenaёle Coat, Senior Program Associate of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, discussed the purpose of these meetings in addressing critical issues 
pertaining to security and international collaboration in the biological sciences.
13
  At the first 
meetings in Jordan and Kuwait, scientists in the region identified three primary policy concerns.  
First, insufficient funding and institutional support for many doctoral and post-doctoral programs 
leads to ongoing “brain drain.”  Secondly, scientists and policymakers do not forge strong 
relationships, resulting in poor communication and coordination on vital policy concerns.  
                                                          
11
 Ibid. p68  
12
AAAS Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy.2011.  http://cstsp.aaas.org/ last accessed March 12, 
2012 
13
 Information from a presentation by Dr. Gwenaёle Coat and Dr. Chen Kane on July 15, 2011, hosted by the Global 
Green USA, Security and Sustainability Program in Washington, D.C.  A summary of the event is available at 
http://globalgreen.org/press/194. 
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Finally, there is not an established legal framework in the region to facilitate the exchange of 
expertise and research.  The inability to effectively collaborate within the region hampers the 
capacity of research institutions and governments to respond to some of their shared problems, 
such as the spread of infectious and chronic diseases. 
 Certainly one of the smaller track-II projects currently operating in the Middle East, the 
CSTSP program nonetheless draws attention to the variety of security issues present in the 
region.  At the same event as Dr. Gwenaёle Coat’s presentation, Dr. Chen Kane, Senior Research 
Associate of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, presented a response to some 
of the concerns advanced in the CSTSP meetings.  Kane proposed that the Middle East is 
uniquely disadvantaged compared to other regions because it does not have an established 
intergovernmental organization.  Such a regional organization could bring governments together 
to collaborate on important security policies.  Instead, it may be more feasible to move forward 
with either bilateral, sub-regional, or regional policy dialogues, so long as the “lowest common 
denominator” can be agreed upon.  This entails identifying a common area of concern upon 
which a new policy regime can develop.  Kane’s four components of a successful process 
included (a) the identification of each state’s threat perception, (b) engagement with local 
stakeholders at an early stage so that their involvement can help sustain the effort, (c) foreign 
parties participating in discussions must learn from past mistakes and avoid overstep, and lastly 
(d) a regional program must include the ability to track member progress and to verify that 
established policies have the desired effect. 
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The Chemical Weapons Conventional Coalition 
 
 The Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (CWCC) is a young and growing network 
of NGOs dedicated to the elimination of chemical weapons.  The CWCC was founded in 2009 
under the leadership of Global Green USA.  The explicit mission of the CWCC is to promote the 
universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  Currently the states remaining 
outside the CWC include Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria.  
The CWCC is included in this analysis because as an organization they have identified the 
Middle East as a priority, as three of the most influential states in the region are outside the 
Convention.  On April 13, 2011, the CWCC held its second general session at the Technical 
Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).  The meeting 
included 19 NGOs from 14 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas.
14
  Today, the 
CWCC includes 50 members, with the hope of doubling membership within the coming year.
15
  
Although they have yet to hold a summit of the Coalition in the Middle East, there are tentative 
plans for the summer of 2012.   
 The CWCC is notable, despite being relatively unproven as a Track-II arms control 
forum, because of its coalition structure.  Hopefully, the CWCC network will be able to continue 
expanding, especially with regard to partnerships with NGOs and security studies program in the 
Middle East.  As it stands, and as is the case with most Track-II projects, the biggest hurdle for 
the CWCC is the identification of funding sources.  Global Green USA has submitted a variety 
of grant proposals to help support the potential 2012 conference, mostly to delegations to the 
                                                          
14
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “OPCW Hosts Second General Meeting of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition.” April 15, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-
hosts-2nd-general-meeting-of-chemical-weapons-convention-coalition/ last accessed March 13, 2012 
15
 Interview with Dr. Paul Walker Ph.D., Program Director, Global Green USA, Security and Sustainability 
Program. 
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OPCW.  The most substantial proposal is currently to Norway for $3 million to support CWCC 
conferences over the next three years. 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
 
 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has contributed to Track-II 
projects in a number of ways since the 1990s, including working groups dedicated to developing 
confidence building measures for the Middle East, and the feasibility of constructing an 
electronic network for security and arms control issues. However, SIPRI made its most 
substantial contribution to Track-II efforts in the Middle East with their report analyzing the 
potential establishment of a Middle East security Regime.
16
  The report was the product of a 
series of meetings of an expert group which met four times from 1997 to 1998.  Peter Jones, one 
of the more prolific writers in the area of Middle East security and Track-II negotiation, was the 
project organizer.  After meetings were concluded, Jones toured the region distributing the report 
and sharing the conclusions of the expert group with regional parties.
17
  The report from the 
expert group was republished in 2011 to include a new introduction and afterward from Peter 
Jones.   
 The SIPRI report outlined a number of recommendations for the establishment of a 
regional security regime, starting with guiding principles.  The first principle outlined in the 
report is the necessary establishment of regional security norms.  These norms should provide 
the foundation for a security regime to address present and future policy concerns.  These norms 
should “compliment and expand upon” the norms outlined by the United Nations Charter, but 
                                                          
16
 Kaye 2007 
17
 Peter Jones. 2011. "The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group: Still Relevant to the Middle East?" 
EU Non-Proliferation Consortium 
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maintain relevance to the specific security conditions of the Middle East.  The expert group made 
it explicitly clear in the report that they sought to avoid restricting the flexibility of states 
participating in the establishment of the security regime by creating overly burdensome guiding 
principles and prerequisites.  The report also included some recommended steps toward a 
regional security regime.  First and foremost, it will be necessary to make progress in the peace 
process before a viable security regime can be established, but regional policymakers should 
begin the process of developing a framework for a regime that would satisfy their particular 
interests.  The regime, when established, will not include all regional parties.  It will therefore be 
necessary to create a flexible, or “geometry variable” framework that will allow new 
membership, so long as they are willing to accept the already established principles of the 
existing regime.  The issues identified by participants should account for all concerns of member 
states, but the timeline for addressing these concerns must be flexible. 
 The work of the expert group is also notable because of the composition of its 
membership.  In geographical terms, many significant regional participants are accounted for: 
Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Morocco, Jordan, Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey.  Also included 
in the group were participants from Sweden, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Russia.  The 
composition of the group is well reflected in their report; the regional representation grounds the 
conclusions of the group firmly in an accurate presentation of regional conditions and 
sensitivities, while the extra-regional participants provided insight into precedent-setting security 
regimes with which they have prior experience.  Although the participants did not include any 
official government contributors, many of them hail from institutes in their home countries 
specializing in security or defense studies. 
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The Search for Common Ground 
 
 The Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is notable not only because of the 
organization’s well established history of peace facilitation and advocacy, but because they 
maintain regional offices in the Middle East as part of their Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) program.
18
  The SFCG currently maintains operations in Israel, Lebanon, and Morocco.  
Until recently they also had offices in Tunisia and Yemen.  The SFCG work in Lebanon and 
Morocco focuses primarily on civil issues.  Their office in Jerusalem, established in 2000, 
promotes the development of positive relationships between Palestinians and Israelis through a 
variety of multi-track programs.  Many of the programs housed in the Jerusalem office 
emphasize media engagement and interfaith dialogue and advocacy.
19
   
 Although the project is no longer active today, the SFCG sponsored a program from 1992 
to 1994 called the Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East (IPCME), now known 
as the as the Search for Common Ground in the Middle East.  In this series of talks Israeli and 
Palestinian representatives developed a set of security arrangements that might have been 
successful in resolving the Syrian-Israeli peace process, if it had not been cut short.
20
  The SFCG 
was the only organization to have been successful in establishing a working framework for such 
a process.  Unfortunately, in December 1993, talks were derailed by press leaks, and so 
prevented any real conclusion from being reached.
21
  Agha provides four critiques of the Track-
II process in an attempt to explain the failure of this SFCG project.  First, many of the Syrians 
participating in the dialogue had little experience with security policy, and so were poorly 
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positioned to usefully contribute to policy development.  Second, Track-II negotiations are often 
extremely vulnerable to leaks.  In the same vein, a third critique is the asymmetry between the 
parties.  Israeli representatives were not official members of the government, whereas the Syrian 
participants were, thus making them significantly more vulnerable.  Lastly, there were no clearly 
identified mentors.  In Agha’s approach, mentors are individuals who serve to both facilitate 
discussion and relay developments from talks back to governments and interested parties.  
Conflict resolution does not take place in a vacuum, so it is vital to maintain ongoing dialogue 
with parties not directly engaged in the process.  In the absence of mentors, Track-II negotiations 
are likely to fall short of their potential. 
 More recently, the SFCG hosted Madrid +15, which took place in Madrid from January 
10-12, 2007.  The conference included representatives from Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.  The conference was held in commemoration of the 15
th
 
anniversary of the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference.  The most touted result from the 
brief series of meetings was an agreement among the assembled parties that “there is a need to 
firmly reassert the spirit of Madrid 1991” and that “participants called for a return to negotiations 
and for an official International Peace Conference.”22  It is interesting to consider the differences 
between the two projects.  The 1993 talks were considered a failure, whereas those in 2007 were 
an apparent success.  Clearly, the difference is not the product, but the scope and ambition of the 
goals set out to guide the two processes, by which failure or success are determined. 
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The Cooperative Monitoring Center 
 
 Sandia National Laboratories opened the doors of the Cooperative Monitoring Center 
(CMC) in 1994 with the hope that if more security experts in more countries were made aware of 
available monitoring technology, they might be more amenable to regional security 
arrangements.  Few countries, especially those in the Middle East, possess the resources and 
technical expertise necessary to develop monitoring technology that could provide verification of 
arms control regime adherence.
23
  During the 1990s the role of CMC was largely educational.  In 
July 1994, the CMC hosted a workshop attended by representatives of military, governmental, 
and academic institutions in Israel, Egypt, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait.  The purpose of the 
workshop was to provide a forum in which regional leaders could meet with each other and 
representatives from the U.S. to share monitoring techniques and technology.
24
  The hope was to 
provide a foundation for the development of confidence and security building measures that 
could support an eventual arms control agreement or a new regional security regime.  In 1996, 
the CMC hosted representatives from Egypt, Jordan, and Israel to review options for a Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ).  A number of similar events took place throughout 
the 1990s and into the early 2000s, some of which were in partnership with government 
departments (e.g. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Energy). 
 In October of 2003 a new CMC opened in Amman, Jordan.  In a region of the world 
more prone to violent conflict and cold government relations, the mission of the center was to 
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promote a culture of trust.
25
  Many of the activities hosted by the CMC in Amman are modeled 
after its predecessor at Sandia.  The specific regional issues emphasized by the center include 
border security and management, non-proliferation of WMD, public health, resource 
management, and environmental security.   
 
 
Part II: Building a Regional Security Coalition: The Application of Theory 
 
 As illustrated by the expert group in the SIPRI report, and reiterated by Peter Jones in the 
2011 republication of their report, one of the primary goals of a regional security regime should 
be the development of new security norms.
26
  By allowing parties to the regime to collaborate on 
their shared concerns, new behaviors will spread and gradually become the natural means of 
interaction between governments.  Unfortunately, given the current political state of the Middle 
East, there are only three paths to the establishment of a security regime.  The first, and most 
likely, is the creation of a small coalition of states who will set out semi-inclusive guiding 
principles that would allow the coalition to grow until it encompasses each state in the region.  
Unfortunately, the creation of such a regime today would likely develop along existing political 
lines, and fail to grow into an inclusive body.  A second, and more abstract approach, would 
require multiple instances of extraordinary political leadership and risk-taking.  If the political 
leadership of Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Iran were to jointly decide to enter into a security 
arrangement, including monitoring systems and an array of confidence building measures, it 
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would almost certainly provide a foundation for a regionally inclusive regime.  Of course, the 
confluence of conditions necessary for this approach to be successful is unlikely enough to be 
prohibitive.  Consider the well-known example of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel, the product of the previous year’s negotiations at Camp David.  Signed in Washington 
D.C. by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the 1979 
treaty was an unprecedented step forward for Middle East peace negotiation.  Although in some 
regards this is an example of the sort of political leadership necessary to forge a regional security 
regime for the Middle East, the path to 1979 is different in two important ways.  First, both 
Egypt and Israel stood to gain much from closer relations with the United States following the 
treaty, and secondly, the complexity of a bilateral treaty is hardly comparable to an inclusive 
multilateral approach.  It would have been impossible in 1979, or at least substantially more 
difficult, to pass a treaty including Syria and Iraq, just as today it is an overwhelmingly daunting 
task to develop a treaty including Syria and Iran. 
Finally, the third possible approach would be facilitated by a network of NGOs.  In 
similar fashion as the first option, the network could settle on certain guiding principles that 
would provide a foundation for an unofficial security regime.  The hope driving this sort of 
unorthodox proposal is that within most nations of the Middle East, there exist organizations and 
parties who have several advantageous characteristics: they have less at stake than governments 
when participating in regional dialogue, they have greater credibility than authoritative and often 
corrupt governments, and who possess a willingness to engage with their regional counterparts.  
In contrast, the last half-century of Middle East relations was dominated by debilitating state 
interests and a frequent unwillingness to compromise and engage.  The unofficial approach, 
although it suffers from a number of possible setbacks of its own sort, would provide a setting 
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for the development of new security norms that would provide a framework for building an 
official equivalent. 
 The purpose of this section is to develop a theoretical framework for the effective 
operation of a collaborative NGO effort in the Middle East.  The section begins by reviewing 
different perspectives on the operation and purpose of security regimes.  Divided into two broad 
categories, examples of security regimes include Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO), the 
purpose of which are to create collaborative communities which coordinate efforts on a variety 
of policy issues (e.g. NATO, OSCE, etc.), and more restrictive security regimes based on the 
enforcement of a single shared policy interest, often relating to arms control or disarmament (e.g. 
CWC, BTWC, NPT, SALT).  Discussion of the issues surrounding a Track-II security coalition 
in the second section will incorporate the substantial body of literature concerning the 
development, transmission, and diffusion of security norms.  In the third section, I analyze the 
educational role of a Track-II security coalition as it pertains to security policy.  Much of this 
section is concerned with the role of public opinion in the formation and enactment of security 
and foreign policy, and so will discuss how the coalition might undertake a moderating role 
between publics and governments.  As moderators, NGOs can facilitate both the transmission of 
public opinion to policymakers and, through educational track II programs, better familiarize 
regional publics with complex regional security issues.  As much of the existing research 
concerning public opinion and security policy is grounded in data from the United States 
electorate, and uses voting trends to support its various conclusion, it is an important component 
of this section to both attempt to translate some of this work to the conditions observable in the 
Middle East, and to propose new areas of quantitative research in the field.   
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The following section builds on the theoretic framework presented in Part II to elaborate 
on the mechanics, composition, and goals of a proposed track-II security coalition.  This section 
further develops perspectives on the establishment and growth of a coalition, focusing on the 
flexibility and adaptability of the model.  There is also a discussion of practical concerns, such as 
voting processes, strategies for policy collaboration, and perhaps most importantly, funding. 
 
Security Regimes: Theory and the Middle East 
There are a variety of differing perspectives on how security regimes should best 
function, and the role they play in international relations.  Better understanding security regimes 
will allow us to consider the development of a track II coalition that is intended to replicate 
certain functions and goals of an official security regime.  I include three definitions of security 
regime which encapsulate the variety in the field.  A traditional definition is provided by Robert 
Jervis.  A security regime in this view consists of “those principles, rules, and norms that permit 
nations to be restrained in behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.”27  This definition 
represents the realist perspective on international security by emphasizing balance of power and 
the role of competition between states.  Building from his definition, Jervis articulates a model 
for a security regime, the primary purpose of which is to restrict the behavior of participants.  
Later definitions will allow more room for the understanding that security regimes ought to 
function as facilitating arrangements for inter-state cooperation.  The cooperative perspective is 
more applicable to the track II model to be presented later, and should take precedent of Jervis’ 
realist perspective.  The most general and accommodating definition comes from Stephen 
Kranser; regimes are “institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which 
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facilitate a convergence of expectations.”28  This definition is particularly helpful because it 
emphasizes the core components of a security regime – norms, rules, and convergence – rather 
than tying the definition to a set of activities, institutional structures, or the types of relationships 
existing between member states.  If there were an opposite perspective to Robert Jervis, it would 
be Janne Nolan, who specifically describes the cooperative function of a security regime.  
“Cooperative engagement is a strategic principle that seeks to accomplish its purposes through 
institutionalized consent rather than through threats of material or physical coercion.”29  Nolan’s 
definition of a security regime organized around a cooperative purpose is most appropriate for an 
unofficial coalition.  In her text, Nolan uses Western Europe to illustrate the ideal operation of a 
cooperative organization.  Although conditions in the Middle East are significantly more 
complex than those in Western Europe, making it difficult to draw useful parallels, cooperation 
is the appropriate priority in both regions.  Many scholars of Middle East security lean more 
towards the realist approach, and in some cases they are right to do so, but only when evaluating 
official security regimes in the absence of a track II foundation.  For an unofficial coalition, 
cooperation and the encouragement of regional diplomacy and the building of political ties 
between governments and civil society is of paramount concern. 
Regardless of definition, the core of a security regime is a shared set of norms.  These can 
be norms of military engagement, norms of diplomatic engagement, or social norms.  It may be 
useful to think of security regimes as institutionalized norms.
30
  For example, consider the 
evolution of the norm against chemical weapons.  Chemical weapons have rarely been deployed 
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since they were first introduced to the theater of war.  These infrequent but devastating instances 
most notably include World War I and the Iran-Iraq war.
31
  Since their invention, the use of 
chemicals in warfare was been an international taboo, explaining why so few cases exist in 
which they have been deployed.  This near universally accepted norm was the foundation for the 
CWC, which is a type of security regime relating specifically to arms control.
32
 
The common thread binding all effective security regimes together is the existence of 
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM).  As with security regimes, there are 
competing definitions of confidence building measures.  In a study of Middle East CSBM Yair 
Euron provides a definition.  “CSBM are measures taken in the strategic-military arena that 
regulate the military behavior of states in conflict, leading to the reduction of uncertainty on both 
sides in regard to: general military escalation, crisis escalation, surprise attacks, and low-level 
violence.”33  This understanding of CSBM emphasizes the role of the military and the transition 
from active conflict to detente.  Particularly in regard to the Middle East, contributors to the field 
tend to favor CSBM that engage militaries in information-sharing, intelligence, crisis simulation, 
and joint training exercises.  However, once again it is necessary to take a different approach to 
confidence building when considering the role of track II projects.  A more inclusive perspective 
is provided by Michael D. Intriligator.  CSBM include “political, economic or other 
activities…whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral.”34  This approach is closer to the sense 
used in this paper.  However, because an unofficial coalition cannot make policy governing 
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military, economic or political actions, the arsenal of CSBM is greatly reduced.  As is discussed 
in the section outlining the structure and composition of the proposed coalition, the primary goal 
ought to be the facilitation of regional political engagement.  The CSBM employed in the early 
stages of regional cooperation should appropriately be limited to dialogue.  From this foundation 
it will be easier to build more advanced and potentially compromising CSBM in the areas of 
military affairs, governance, and economics. 
The application of CSBM came into its prime during the détente period of the Cold War 
as the United States and the Soviet Union began to negotiate arms limitations and verification 
protocol.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, multilateral CSBM were used in Eastern 
Europe, and were not limited to the great power arrangements of the Cold War.
35
  These 
activities can be divided into three categories: communication, physical measures, and military 
behavior.
36
  Communication, the most important general category for our consideration, should 
itself be broken into two parts.  First is the communication between government officials acting 
in a diplomatic capacity.  By engaging in dialogue, leaders build important relationships with 
each other, which help support cooperation and trust between governments.  The second part of 
communication, which is more common in CSBM literature, encompasses a variety of 
information-sharing activities.  Returning to the earlier example of U.S.-Soviet arms reduction 
agreements, an important component of these sorts of arrangements are verification procedures 
that include sharing force posture information, including the number of weapons stockpiled, 
delivery systems, etc.  The second category, physical measures, includes primarily geographic 
concerns.  Euron finds the establishment of demilitarized zones as the most common CSBM in 
this category.  Finally, CSBM in the military behavior category include such things as rules of 
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engagement, collective training exercises, and other activities having to do specifically with 
interactions between military institutions.  Intriligator provides a list of 22 proposals for 
confidence building in the Middle East.
37
  The preponderance of the proposals draw from prior 
efforts in the region relating to weapons technology, delivery systems, communications, warning 
and surprise attack procedures, accidental or inadvertent war, and both legal and illegal arms 
shipments.  These CSBM are divided into three phases for implementation, and despite being 
nearly two decades old, many are still relevant and worthy of consideration. 
Related to the types of CSBM incorporated into security regimes, Steven Spiegel 
provides a useful breakdown of the different operating levels of a security regime.
38
  Spiegel 
considers three distinct levels: systemic, domestic, and individual.  The systemic level describes 
the way states interact as part of a network of competing interests.  The systemic relationships 
between states influence their behavior in pursuit of their interests, while also in some cases 
redefining states interests.  The name of the next layer of interaction, the domestic level, is 
somewhat misleading.  In his analysis of these interactions, Spiegel is concerned with 
interactions between bureaucracies, and the socializing effect these interactions can have.  The 
domestic layer does not pertain to influences from the public.  The domestic layer is at the heart 
of norm transference, one of the primary effects of participation in a security regime.  The 
individual level encompasses interactions between political leadership.  The socializing effect of 
these interactions is similar to the domestic level interactions.  However, it is worth 
differentiating between bureaucrats and political elites because the socializing effect manifests 
differently on the two levels.  On the domestic level, collaboration between government 
departments will influence the perspectives represented in the policy production process, and 
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gradually bring the two governments nearer to consensus by adhering to certain norms.  On the 
individual level, the important effect is the development of relationships between heads of state 
and other political elites.  These relationships make leaders more inclined to cooperate with each 
other and increase the likelihood of further integration and cooperation.  Beyond the three levels 
presented by Spiegel, it is necessary to include the public as a fourth.  The reason this fourth 
layer is not already a standard component of security regime studies is the absence of 
institutionalized interactions between publics and governments in the context of existing security 
regimes; i.e. security regimes are the domain of government elites, and publics are only relevant 
to the extent they influence particular government members of a regime.  The fourth layer is 
important to consider insofar as publics influence the behavior of their governments, a subject 
discussed at length in a later section.  The influence of the public will be doubly important in the 
modeling of an unofficial coalition.  One of the key roles of NGOs in security policy is to 
interact with the public, both to educate the public, and to advocate for public interest in their 
interactions with the government. 
Returning now to security regimes, there are a number of ways to differentiate the 
various types of security regimes.  Evron uses five categories in his analysis, ranging from the 
weakest integrated models, to the strongest, with the primary variances being the number of 
states involved and the number of agreed upon CSBM.  Weakest in the list are security 
conventions.  These regimes are informal arrangements (i.e. they are not organized around a 
codified treaty that articulates the goals and understandings of the parties involved) between 
states that do not maintain diplomatic relations.  The primary enforcement mechanism here is 
unilateral deterrence.  Qualified regimes are next, with either unilateral or mutual deterrence, and 
a complex network of CSBM.  Third are normal security regimes.  These arrangements are based 
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on formal diplomatic relations between participants, and are also grounded in a network of 
CSBM.  Common security regimes are similar to normal regimes, except the former includes 
multilateral arrangements (recall the CWC example) and are characterized by a greater degree of 
cooperation between participants.  At the top end of the spectrum, cooperative security regimes 
maintain a very high level of cooperation between participants and adhere to a robust and 
penetrating set of CSBM. 
In contrast to Evron, I choose to organize my consideration of security regimes around 
function, rather than the degree of integration.  With Evron’s approach, there is no end to the 
variances between the degrees of integration as you compare regions and historical periods, so 
the distinctions used by Evron are not particularly informative when trying to understand and 
contrast existing regimes.  Furthermore, my approach is different because it does not offer a 
consideration of the fundamentally weak and almost non-existent regimes on the lower end of 
the integration scale.  However, it is worth noting that the preponderance of security regimes that 
have existed in the Middle East since the mid-twentieth century have been of this sort: weak, 
bilateral, and short-lived.
39
   
It is more useful to think about security regimes in four categories: legal, restrictive, 
cooperative, and allied.  Within each category it should be understood that different regimes will 
maintain varying degrees of participant integration and cooperation.  Legal regimes are those 
without a strong central organization to facilitate regime activities and dialogue.  The best 
examples are weapon of mass destruction free zones (WMDFZ), such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Bangkok Treaty, and the Pelindaba Treaty, each of which are 
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specifically regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones.  There are also treaties banning the 
militarization of Antarctica, the seabed, and space.  These treaties typically represent the 
codification of existing international security norms, and do not pertain directly to the settlement 
of a specific conflict.  The CSBM included in legal regimes are verification measures agreed 
upon by regime members that enable them to confirm adherence to the norms established by the 
regime.  
Restrictive regimes rely primarily on CSBM that involve military coordination.  These 
are regimes discussed earlier in the realist model by Robert Jervis; the regime exists in a state of 
conflict, and the measures imposed by the regime are intended to restrict the behavior of its 
members in the mutually acknowledged interest of preventing future military conflict.  Third, 
cooperative regimes are organized around cooperative principles.  These regimes are not the 
byproduct of active conflict in the way of realist regimes.  Cooperative organizations rely 
primarily on political coordination between governments to address regional issues.  These 
regimes are likely to evolve out of the success of restrictive regimes, and so will maintain certain 
military CSBM.  Examples of cooperative regimes include the OSCE and ASEAN.  Lastly, the 
most integrated form of security regimes are those between allied countries.  These regimes 
include collective security arrangements in addition to highly integrated CSBM, including shared 
military training exercises and shared technology.  The most familiar example of this sort of 
arrangement is NATO. 
As noted earlier, the Middle East has a history of short-lived, weak security regimes.  The 
preponderance of these regimes were restrictive, as they were established in the wake of active 
military conflicts and were limited to military CSBM.  However, founded in May 1981, the 
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Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is a reasonably successful example 
of a cooperative regime.  Consider the following description of the GCC goals: 
The GCC Charter states that the basic objectives are to effect coordination, 
integration and inter-connection between Member States in all fields, 
strengthening ties between their peoples, formulating similar regulations in 
various fields such as economy, finance, trade, customs, tourism, legislation, 
administration, as well as fostering scientific and technical progress in industry, 
mining, agriculture, water and animal resources, establishing scientific research 
centers, setting up joint ventures, and encouraging cooperation of the private 
sector.
40
 
 
As a cooperative security regime, the focus of the GCC is on economic integration, 
scientific collaboration, social programs, and other non-military issues.  In the study of Middle 
Eastern security, the GCC is a useful example of how to build a successful regime, either through 
a regional structure, or as a network of sub-regional regimes including, and modeled after, the 
GCC.  The obstacle faced by these proposals, which is often not addressed, is the differences in 
composition between either regional or sub-regional organizations.  The GCC, compared the rest 
of the Middle East, is relatively homogeneous.  Its membership includes the United Arab 
Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, 
and Kuwait.  Note that Yemen is not included among the membership, thus explaining the 
survival of the regime through intermittent diplomatic and military confrontations between Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen.  A credible regional regime would require the membership of Israel, Syria, 
Iran, and Egypt (the participation of other states in the region is less controversial outside this 
central group).  Likewise, a network of sub-regional regimes would require the participation of 
Yemen in the GCC, the inclusion of Israel in a Levantine organization, and participation from 
peripheral states such as Iran either as an independent state or a member of a regional group in 
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West Asia.  With either approach, inclusivity is a problem, and the model and precedent 
established by the GCC is unhelpful. 
Security regimes face three types of problems, mostly having to do with the development 
stages, the most concerning of which is political instability.  When entering into a security 
arrangement, a government will be less likely to accept a partnership that includes governments 
facing intense domestic opposition or which display instability within the regime.  Spiegel’s41 
work identified both Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadaffi as examples of unstable regimes 
which would make poor regime participants.  In both cases, the elite political leadership 
appeared too far removed from the public to make them credible partners in a long term security 
arrangement.  It goes without saying that Spiegel’s choice of examples turned out to be 
particularly poignant.  A second problem security regimes are prone to facing are dramatic shifts 
in economic conditions, both regionally, and when isolated in single member states.  This is 
similar to political issues because poor economic conditions can result in public unrest and 
dissatisfaction with the government.  However, in the case of public unrest resulting from an 
economic downturn, the onset of these conditions can be rapid and are usually unpredictable, and 
can destabilize an already establish regime.
42
  Finally, and of particular relevance to the Middle 
East, the balance of power between non-member states and member states in a region can 
influence the integrity of a security regime.  In the context of the Middle East, this problem 
would likely arise if a regime were established that was not inclusive.  For instance, if a security 
regime were created among exclusively Arab states, the divisions in the region would be 
exacerbated depending on Israel’s perception of the new Arab organization.  In this instance, the 
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creation of a security regime would effectively worsen the security relations in the region, rather 
than improve them.  The same argument can be made for including Iran in a security regime.  In 
the Middle East, the threat of an arms race in response to a poorly considered security regime is 
very real, and should be deterrent enough to prevent the creation of a regime that lacks regional 
universality. 
 
Security Norms 
 A norm is a standard of behavior that governs a group of actors of a particular, unifying 
identity.
43
  These standards of behavior exist as networks of inter-subjective understandings 
between actors.  Academic discourse on norms span both political science and sociology, where 
political scientists typically emphasize the role of international norms in political society, and 
sociologists examine the role of social norms in everyday life.  Among political scientists, 
liberals, constructivists, rationalists, and realists maintain four distinct perspectives on norm 
theory.
44
  In brief, the liberal perspective describes norms as providing incentives for social 
actors and political leadership to behave in a particular manner.  In this way, norms constrain 
behavior.  Constructivists believe that norms are learned by elites through interaction, and to that 
extent, they are shared understandings that constitute actor identities.  The rationalist perspective 
differs in the provided understanding of norm propagation.  Political elites decide to adhere to 
norms because of strategic interests.  By understanding the process of norm propagation in this 
way, the realist perspective runs against a theory of norms where they spread by learning, or 
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where they constrain behaviors.  Lastly, the realist perspective denies the existence of norms.  
Instead, realists describe larger behavioral trends with micro-level strategic calculations, where a 
belief in norms is an abstraction and should instead be considered as a network of interacting, 
independent choices.  Understanding norms is useful when evaluating political behavior and 
social organization, and for the purposes of this paper, are particularly relevant to understanding 
how certain beliefs and behaviors can become standardized throughout a region. 
 Given that the primary focus of this paper is security policy in the Middle East, the reader 
should assume that unless otherwise stated, the norms under consideration are security norms.  
Furthermore, for the purposes of this paper, norms should be thought of as operating on two 
distinct but related levels.  First, norms exist between states.  These can be codified legal norms 
or norms that have developed through a history of state behavior and interaction.  These sorts of 
international norms traditionally include rules of engagement in military conflict, diplomatic 
norms for interacting with foreign governments, behavior in international waters, the 
understanding of sovereignty and sovereign rights, etc.  The second sort of norms are those 
among publics.  As it pertains to security policy, these norms can be difficult to evaluate, 
primarily because the polity is a complex organization, and often cannot be discussed effectively 
as a unified whole.  For this reason, norms existing on the national level ought to be considered 
in parts: elites, the attentive public, and the mass public.  This division is particularly useful in 
the discussion of the transfer of norms between states and the diffusion of norms within states. 
 When studying the influence of norms, it is helpful to recognize that norms cannot be 
“bad” from the frame of reference of an adherent to a given norm.45  It is possible, from the 
perspective of an outsider, to make normative claims about the appropriateness or effectiveness 
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of a given observable norm, but this sort of commentary is not helpful in understanding the 
character of a norm.  A norm is a way of behaving, both among states and among individuals.  
Unlike a law or rule, a norm is not something that needs to be referenced to be understood by an 
adherent, but instead is accepted as a natural or given standard of behaving.  More difficult to 
evaluate is the way in which this sort of standard is passed along.  Although norms have a sense 
about them of being natural, they are clearly not.  Instead they evolve through a socializing 
process which unlike with established norms, can involve a normative judgment from potential 
adherents. 
 Although there is a substantial body of work concerning the existence of norms, 
especially regarding their influence on international politics, considerably less has been said 
about the development of norms and how they are propagated.  In this work, I lean heavily on the 
analysis presented by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in their 1998 collaboration, 
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”46  Of particular relevance, their work 
outlines a “lifecycle” of norm development.47  This lifecycle exists in four stages: norm 
emergence, realignment, norm cascade, and internalization.  Three stages are from Finnemore 
and Sikkink, but in order to more effectively accommodate the Middle East, I include 
“realignment” as a separate second stage. 
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Figure three provides a useful reference in understanding the process of norm diffusion.  
The process it depicts will become clearer in the following pages.  In summary, part “A” 
identifies the beginning of the process at the norm entrepreneur, identified in the diagram by a 
red dot.  Part “B” is the process throughout which norms are spread between publics through 
social institutions, and in the case presented in this paper, through NGO engagement projects.  
Part “C” depicts the spreading of a norm from some segment of society, perhaps a social or 
economic elite, to government elites.  Part “D” shows the process of norm diffusion through 
government interaction, a process also facilitated by NGO projects.  Finally, part “E” shows the 
cascade of norms to other regional states after a critical mass of influential states is achieved. 
The most important actor in the norm emergence stage is the entrepreneur.  Although the 
originator of a particular norm could be thought of as a state, I restrict this part of the process to 
individuals.
48
  Restricting discussion of norm entrepreneurs to individuals will assist the coming 
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discussion of the Track-II security coalition and the role played by diplomats, bureaucrats, 
academics, analysts, and others participating in dialogue with foreign counterparts.  Norm 
entrepreneurs identify specific concerns about an existing way of behaving.  Norm entrepreneurs 
typically have an organizational foundation, are characterized by altruism, empathy, idealism and 
commitment, and use persuasion to propagate their ideas.
49
  Finnemore and Sikkink specifically 
identify issues of human agency, indeterminacy, chance occurrences, and favorable events as the 
origins for most norms.
50
  Issues identified at this stage in the formation of security norms 
involves a specific government practice or policy that develops within the context of the 
necessary originating conditions.  In order for changes on this micro-level to develop into a new 
norm, the policy in question must be part of a broader network of similar policies.  The reform of 
the parts can potentially lead to a change in norms.   
Part of the role of a norm entrepreneur is to position an issue such that it is translatable to 
other individuals and states.  David Snow refers to this process as “frame alignment.”  Much of 
this process has to do with the language used to describe an issue.  By creating particular 
meaningful associations with an issue, the norm entrepreneur creates frames which organize 
collective experiences and influence the actions of potential norm adherents.
51
   
 The organizational platform of the entrepreneur is particularly important as an 
educational tool.  NGOs and IGOs rely heavily on individual expertise and educational programs 
to influence policy and behavior.
52
  Education is of particular importance to the operation of the 
security coalition.  Educational programs and the use of experts to support the propagation of 
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norms nationally and internationally.  In this sense, education is used to socialize participants to 
the new way of behaving.  Perhaps the best observable instances of this function of NGOs is 
among international advocacy organizations.  In particular, consider Greenpeace and Amnesty 
International.  Greenpeace USA recently launched their “how clean is your cloud” campaign, an 
effort to influence Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon to advance their use of clean energy to support 
the operations of their data clouds.
53
  This particular campaign is part of a broader Greenpeace 
campaign for renewable energy, an advocacy operation that, along with other similar 
organizations, has successfully influenced the framing of the energy debate, and to that end, the 
norms of behavior for a substantial portion of society.  Amnesty International maintains offices 
in more than 80 countries and works to promote the respect of human rights as a norm of 
behavior.
54
  Much of their work is done through advocacy programs and digital campaigning.  
Amnesty International is a product of one of the most successful contemporary framing efforts; 
the categorization of certain rights as “fundamental,” “unalienable,” or “human”, frames certain 
behavior negatively and has thereby produced a new canon, both international and domestic (the 
most obvious being the International Declaration of Human Rights).  Through their educational 
activities, Amnesty International extends and reinforces human rights norms. 
 Education can also have the opposite effect.  It stands to reason that if the dissemination 
of information can bolster the creation of a norm, it can also present a hindrance.  Finnemore and 
Sikkink specifically reference national government and IGO training programs which resist 
spreading norms.  Resistance is not necessarily explicit; that is, the spreading norm is not 
identified specifically.  Instead, resistance is a product of competing ideologies, behaviors, or 
frames of reference. 
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 Finally, emerging norms are sometimes supported by institutionalization.  Recall I 
suggested that norms should be thought of as distinct from laws.  While this is the case for truly 
ubiquitous norms, an important strategy in norm propagation is the use of laws to reframe and 
standardize a given set of behaviors.  For a domestic example of this strategy, consider President 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, or later, the order by Federal Judge Robert Mehrige in 
1971 to begin busing students as an anti-segregation measure.
55
  Both of these cases exemplify 
the use of legal authority to lend enhanced legitimacy to an issue and enforce an already 
expanding norm.  As for international law, perhaps the best examples come from arms control 
regimes.  In a particularly poignant example from Finnemore and Sikkink, the institutionalization 
of the prohibitions on the use of chemical weapons, in the form of the CWC, helped gain support 
for sanctions against Iraq during the First Gulf War.   
Around this point in the “lifecycle” of a norm, when the number of adherents has grown 
significantly enough from the initiating entrepreneur, the norm approaches a tipping point.  For 
Finnemore and Sikkink, the tipping point is the division between stage one and the cascade of 
stage two.  However, in discussing the Middle East, it is necessary to consider realignment as an 
intermediate step.  Also, recognize that while the first stage was discussed in terms of individual 
interactions and behavior, it is assumed in the transition to the second stage that the emerging 
norm has taken hold in the originating state (or coalition of states) and through interactions with 
representatives of other states, is already spreading to neighbors and regional partners.  This 
implies that a tipping point has already been reached on a domestic level in at least one country, 
and that step two progresses primarily in the spread of norms between governments and social 
elites, and the conflicts between standing norms and the emerging norm.  The Middle East, for a 
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number of historical reasons, is a nexus of both competing norms, and competing effects or 
interpretations of norms, both between states and between segments of civil society.  The former 
of the two conditions is most famously exemplified by the regional unrest surrounding the Camp 
David Accords and the official peace treaty between Egypt and Israel enacted the following year.  
In this instance, the Egyptian government was in a state of transition between two competing 
norms.  The dominant regional norm at the time with regard to diplomatic behavior was 
decidedly anti-Israeli among Arab states.  The competing extra-regional norm, to which the 
primary adherents were the United States and Western Europe, was supportive in their relations 
with Israel.  In this case, norm realignment was isolated in Egypt, but it had the regional effect of 
upsetting the balance of power, or more appropriately prestige, among Arab States.   
Here is where my model diverges from the traditional canon of norms research in 
political science and international relations.  In analyzing the norm lifecycle, there ought to be 
two distinct levels of engagement under consideration.  First is the traditional approach which 
explains the creation of international norms in terms of government reactions to changing state 
interests and regional dynamics.  The second level, which is more important to the discussion of 
the Middle East, is the spread of norms through international civil society, and the effect of that 
spread on government behavior as civil society and governments collaborate on regional issues.  
In many cases, the civil society component may be negligible.  However, cases in which state 
norms as embodied by government behavior are well entrenched in a given region, the behavior 
and flexibility of civil society must be considered.  As a norm gains domestic momentum, in 
certain cases the transition of a norm from a domestic to an international arena will occur.  This 
will happen first through civil society activities where norm identities will differ between civil 
society and government.  Over time, realignment occurs as the behavior of governments shift to 
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overlay with civil society; this is the operating theory upon which the notion of a track-II security 
coalition is founded.   
Few cases exist in which regions have moved from a state of conflict to the establishment 
of a regional security regime, and none exist in which the transition entails so dramatic a shift in 
state behaviors as it does in the Middle East.  The origin of the idea is the scholarship that 
evaluates the goals of NGOs operating in the Middle East, and their effectiveness in pursuing 
their goals.
56
  A common theme in much of this work is the importance of creating new security 
norms, or depending on the author, a new security culture.  Regardless the intent is the same.  In 
none of these publications is there discussion of something akin to the analysis present in the 
literature concerning norms, so very little attention is given to the process of creating norms.  
The stated objective in many cases is the creation of a security regime in the region, the purpose 
of which is to propagate more cooperative security norms.
57
  Although in some cases this 
approach has been effective, the Middle East requires the reverse because current state 
behavioral norms are set firmly against a regionally inclusive security regime (i.e. a security 
regime that includes Israel).  The activities of NGOs operating in the Middle East, both 
regionally based and with extra regional origins, clearly display a willingness in some sectors of 
civil society to pursue regional relationships and collaborative efforts that are unfathomable 
among regional governments.  This is the foundation for stage two realignment and the transition 
from a domestic norm to a regional norm. 
In discussing stage three, we have transitioned to state-state interactions as the primary 
area of concern.  Although interactions between domestic actors are still an important component 
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to norm creation on an international level, it is important to emphasize factors relating 
specifically to state behavior in norm creation.  Finnemore and Sikkink rely heavily on the 
explanatory power of state prestige in the spread of norms between states.
58
  They theorize that it 
takes roughly a third of states in a given region before a cascade will be possible.  After a 
“critical mass” of states is achieved, states outside the emerging norm will be inclined to adopt a 
norm in order to avoid being pushed to the periphery of regional politics.  It is important here to 
recognize the composition of a critical mass will vary depending on the influence of individual 
states.  In the Middle East for instance, Israel, Egypt, and Syria as members of a coalition will 
carry substantially more influence than Yemen or Qatar.  The concept of critical mass leading to 
a cascade of new norm adherents in the Middle East is further complicated by the issues 
discussed under stage two.  It cannot be assumed that state interests, especially not prestige, will 
be compelling enough forces to drive a norm towards regional universality.  Iran, for example, 
would not be compelled to adhere to a norm of regional cooperation under the status quo, even if 
a coalition of cooperative states were already emerging, because opposition to Israel and their 
allies is a more fruitful source of state prestige in the region.  However, if stage two is successful, 
regional resistance may be significantly enough reduced to reach Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
tipping point. 
In discussing the spread of norms among individuals, it is common to frame norm 
diffusion as a sort of contagion.  Besides framing understanding as a pejorative, in the case of 
international norms, and based on our understanding of state behavior, it is more accurate to 
think of norm transmission as a deliberative function.
59
  Just as states may be compelled to 
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adhere to a norm because of certain state interests, states already conforming to a new norm will 
be inclined to impress upon their neighbors the value of conformity. 
The fourth and final stage of norm development is the internalization of the new norm.  
In this stage the emerging norm becomes a default behavior, a natural recourse that is not 
disputed.  It is at this stage of norm development when a norm becomes difficult to identify, and 
therefore difficult to study.  The behavior engendered by the standard of the norm becomes 
ubiquitous, and so indistinguishable.  In political science, established norms are not of prominent 
concern because they are not contentious, and are often ignored by popular political debate 
(instead, norms provide the common ground in political debate, they frame the political reality 
for discourse).  For an analysis of existing norms, the institutionalists of sociology are helpful for 
their “denaturalizing” of certain existing norms, such as sovereignty, individualism, and certain 
characteristics of the market.
60
  This particular area of norms research is of less importance to 
our discussion of the track-II security coalition, because norms are much more contentious and 
easier to identify in the emerging three stages of the norm lifecycle, and these three stages are the 
primary concern of the coalition.  However, further research in the influence and development of 
existing social and security norms in the Middle East would be valuable.  The research concerns 
primarily Western states and identifies a significant degree of similarity between states, and ties 
these similarities to past norm cascades.  Understanding similar relationships would be useful. 
The four stages of norm development accommodate both spreading norms between 
individuals and states, where interactions between civil society institutions and governments of 
different states help to establish the emerging norm.  After a norm is established in one or more 
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states, there are a number of ways to explain the greater diffusion of norms.  While prestige is 
not particularly helpful in the discussion norm universality in the Middle East, there are a 
number of processes through which the diffusion of norms might occur as part of a deliberate 
government or civil effort.  Jeffery Checkel provides a vision of these mechanisms that overlay 
well with norm diffusion in the Middle East.
61
  Although Checkel’s work referenced here 
specifically addresses the spread of already established international norms into domestic 
politics, and does not address the evolution of new norms, his attention to civil society and 
education in norm diffusion will be important to understand for a track-II security coalition.  In 
Checkel’s approach, norms can be both constraining and constitutive; i.e. the values inherent in 
an established norm may not be adopted by elites, but the broader acceptance of the norm forces 
some degree of adherence, as opposed to a norm that exists as a shared understanding or identity 
and constitutes a deeper connection between adherents.  Either way a norm is manifest, the 
process through which a norm enters domestic politics is called “empowerment.”  This occurs in 
two possible ways, the first of which is similar to the second stage process of realignment 
previously described.  Checkel articulates a constraining norm that spreads through advocacy by 
civil-society institutions and their interactions with governments.  Elites do not adopt the norm, 
but their behavior is nonetheless constrained by its proliferation.  The second mechanism of 
norm diffusion is through the occurrence of learning and socialization between interacting elites.  
Here, norms are learned and internalized in a constitutive process. 
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Checkel uses a coding process to evaluate the different ways norms spread between 
states.  He applies this approach to some members of the Council of Europe (COE).
62
  Four 
categorizations of states are used in Checkel’s approach: liberal, corporatist, statist, and state-
above-society.  For each category, he identifies which actors will be most influential in the 
diffusion of norms.
63
  In liberal societies the dominant force, and the only one considered, is 
societal pressure on governing elites.  In a corporatist structure, the primary influence is social 
pressure and a secondary factor is participation from elites.  The reverse is true in statist 
structures, where elite learning is dominant and social pressure is secondary.  Lastly, in the 
authoritarian state-above-society structure, the only factor at work is elite learning.  It is worth 
noting that Checkel deliberately leaves out coercion from his analysis, whereby powerful states 
pressure their weaker counterparts to adhere to certain behavioral standards.  This omission is 
explained by his intention to present a causal account of norms influencing international politics 
by synthesizing two previously disparate theoretical perspectives.  Because coercion is part of 
the realist explanation for how norms are perceived and therefore is fundamentally at odds with 
the existence of norms in international politics, it cannot be usefully incorporated in the same 
theoretical framework.  
Checkel uses the successes of the COE to explain the appropriateness of his 
categorizations.  The COE represents a reasonable catalyst for the subject of norms diffusion for 
multiple reasons.  As an international regime, it consists of a variety of states from each segment 
of Checkel’s spectrum of state organization.  Furthermore, among international organizations, 
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the COE is considered one of the most effective collaborative bodies.
64
  Finally, as an advocate 
for the European human rights regime, the COE has proved a successful device for spreading 
humanitarian norms, specifically citizenship and minority rights.  Checkel selected four states for 
his analysis: Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain, which are categorized as state-above-
society, statist, corporatist, and liberal respectively.  The challenge of this sort of analysis is to 
both prove the existence of a norm, and the absence or contested status of the same norm in the 
domestic arenas being evaluated.  In order to achieve this, Checkel relied both on careful 
readings of relevant European treaties a series of interviews with bureaucrats and politicians 
involved in national implementation of the treaties being considered.
65
   
Civil society groups operating in Ukraine are predominantly small and almost entirely 
ignored by the government, hence the importance of elite education for norm diffusion.  The 
successful advance of citizenship rights in Ukraine is explained through the interactions between 
Ukrainian elites in the 1993 Interdepartmental Commission for Questions of Ukraine’s 
Admission to the Council of Europe.  The integration and learning from the admission process 
enabled the diffusion of norms to the political elite in Ukraine, despite the absence of effective 
social pressures.  Like Ukraine, elite learning in Russia was facilitated by groups of government 
elites whose responsibility it was to interact with their COE counterparts.  In this case two bodies 
were established.  The first, the 1992 Citizenship Commission, was attached to the President’s 
office, and the second, the Directorate for Pan-European Cooperation, was part of the Foreign 
Ministry.  Although elite education was the primary mechanism of diffusion at work, the 
Moscow School of Political Studies, although its actions are restricted by the Foreign Ministry, is 
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part of an extensive network which was able to apply limited societal pressure on the 
government.  In Germany, the empowerment process was much more complicated and involved 
considerably more civil society participants.  The best example of societal pressure came in the 
form of a petitioning effort, begun in 1992, which gathered over a million signatures.  There 
were also COE forums which helped to propagate citizenship norms among the public.  As a 
secondary influence, Checkel identifies political leaders who became advocates for the new 
citizenship norms, but whose input was less influential than the petitioning project.  Lastly, the 
liberal structure of Great Britain enables substantial influence to flow from social pressures.  In a 
number of COE-related areas, including citizenship, domestic institutions in Britain have 
appealed to the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights in order to pressure 
British government. 
Checkel’s framework is helpful in organizing one’s thoughts about norm diffusion in a 
given region, but it is lacking in three particular ways.  First, the categorization is an artificial 
process and inherently limits the ability to evaluate differences within categories and confines 
the understanding of subject states.  Although the model appears to fit well with the four 
European states, it may be less instructive if each category were illustrated with more than a 
single state.  Differences among states within categories shows variances that exist between 
similarly structured societies and thus presents problems with Checkel’s model.  Secondly, 
Checkel’s model does not account for changes in state behavior as the diffusion process 
progresses.  The most evident example of this shortcoming in the Middle East is the shift in 
conditions in Egypt since early 2011.  Under the Mubarak government, Egypt would likely be 
considered state-above-society (although a case could be made for statist as well).  Today, 
shifting power structures make it difficult to decisively say which category Egypt should fall 
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into, let alone how particular actors, such as the Military Council, are likely to interact with civil 
organizations.  Admittedly, Checkel’s model is clearly designed for retrospective analysis, so 
shifting conditions and the convolution of current events were not problematic in considering 
European citizenship norms (although he acknowledges a predictive component to his analysis of 
the diffusion to Great Britain).
66
  Finally, the four categories, each with varying degrees of social 
pressure and elite learning acting as the mechanisms of diffusion, does not account for external 
pressures from foreign governments or civil institutions.  To the extent that foreign actors are 
considered, it is as part of the learning process of elites, whereby norms are internalized.  In the 
Middle East is necessary to consider the influence of state and civil society pressures from 
outside the domestic arena.  For instance, the decision-making calculus for Lebanon will vary 
between instances in which it is acting with relative independence, and when it is acting as part 
of a coalition of regional partners.  The analysis of citizenship advocacy in Britain included 
discussion of external pressure, but this should not be isolated in the Liberal category of state 
organization. 
Like Checkel, I do not believe it is useful, let alone accurate, to disallow the simultaneous 
consideration of both constitutive and constraining theories of norm diffusion, operating on 
differing levels and between different institutions, but within the same society.  Depending on 
the actors and circumstances, either process may be extant.  However, I move a step further by 
allowing for both constitutive and constraining effects in either of the two diffusion processes, 
because in some ways the distinction between the two is artificial.  I propose, as part of the 
realignment process, that norms will be learned by government elites not only by interacting with 
other government elites, but through the instruction, example, and cooperation with civil society 
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institutions.  Through this unified process, it seems inevitable that some portion of elites will 
fully internalize the norm, whereas others, influenced both by civil society and their foreign and 
domestic elite counterparts, will be constrained.   
The role of track two projects, as envisioned in this paper, is to enable the process of 
norm diffusion.  By creating previously nonexistent links within and between communities in the 
Middle East, the track II coalition would stand to move regional integration, and the prerequisite 
peace negotiations and disarmament treaties, further than regional precedent.  Although the early 
stages of creating the coalition are a concrete, short-term option for advancing Middle East 
relations, it must be understood that norm diffusion, as a catalyst for improved relations, may 
take many years.  With this broad view of norm diffusion, it is now necessary to narrow our 
focus to a consideration of half the norm diffusion equation; the relationship between publics and 
their governments. 
 
Public Opinion, Education, and Security Policy 
 In providing a review and analysis of public opinion literature, this section serves two 
important purposes.  To begin, a better understanding of public opinion helps to elucidate the 
process of norm diffusion between a given public and their government.  In the terms presented 
in this section, this process is primarily embodied by the various means of public expression, and 
how opinion can be measured, evaluated, and presented to governors.  Additionally, and more 
practically, the presented literature (and accompanying critique) helps to explain how a track two 
coalition can work to avoid the sort of media backlash and public opposition which has dashed 
many previous projects.  This process is the reverse of the former, in that it outlines how track II 
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projects can undertake educational and public engagement programs to help create media 
diversity and ideally, a better informed public. 
Recalling the review of NGO projects in the Middle East, and the importance of 
interacting effectively with the public during the filtering process, the following section analyzes 
perspectives on the interaction between public opinion and security policy.  Most of the work in 
this field uses data based on voting records, polling, and corresponding relationship to policy 
implementation.  Nearly all of this work uses data from the United States, and much of it 
concerns public opinion about either the advancement or elimination of nuclear weapons.  
Although the contributors to this field are many, the limited scope of the existing research 
presents some problems as we turn towards the Middle East.  The most immediate concern is the 
lack of accurate polling in the Middle East on foreign policy and security issues.  In the absence 
of this sort of data it is difficult to reasonably translate the lessons of Western studies to the 
existing circumstances in the Middle East (reminiscent of the problems faced by Checkel in his 
COE case study).  Therefore, much of this section will address broader theories of social 
influence and synthesize a basic theoretical framework for considering the role of public opinion 
in the Middle East. 
Over the last century, two schools of thought have emerged in the study of how public 
opinion influences the state: the traditionalists and the revisionists.  The former generally 
believing the public to be incapable of developing accurate opinions on security and foreign 
policy issues, whereas the latter presents a variety of perspectives explaining how the public can, 
under certain conditions, make positive contributions to foreign policy.  In 1925, Walter 
Lippmann published one of the first and most widely known traditionalist perspectives, in which 
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he famously referred to political leadership being “trampled by the bewildered herd.”67  
Following Lippmann came a long line of scholarship, although many of the most notable 
traditionalists did not come to fore until the 1950s and 1960s.
68
  In their analysis of the field, 
Hank Jenkins-Smith and Kerry Herron identify three traits of the traditionalist perspective.  First, 
mass publics generally lack the sophistication and educational background to contribute to policy 
discussions that involve complex ideological perspectives and technical comprehension.  Second, 
traditionalists rely on empirical evidence suggesting that average citizens lack belief systems that 
can produce useful opinions in the absence of sufficient knowledge.  Finally, the mass public 
lacks the means to analyze and understand complex issues.  Herron and Jenkins-Smith 
characterize the adherents to traditionalism as “political sophisticates, theorists, and academics” 
who came to guide the generally accepted understanding of public opinion. 
To represent the traditionalist perspective, I use the 1956 analysis from Gabriel Almond, 
and the 1968 work by James Rosenau.  Almond begins by dividing society into five components: 
government, media, interest groups, the attentive public, and the mass public.  The nature of the 
division between publics is our foremost concern.  With regard to the mass public, Almond 
points out that the development of security policy, by its nature, is a secretive process.  The 
limits placed on information diffusion in security policy prevent the mass public from 
developing accurate opinions.  Furthermore, Almond supposed that the stakes in discussions of 
security policy, as opposed to domestic policy, are often so great and abstract to the average 
member of the mass public that they become effectively meaningless.  The primary means of 
obtaining information in the mass public is from the mass media, which is itself subject to 
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skewed and incomplete information.  In the absence of knowledge, Almond suggested that the 
mass public responds in “moods” to the stories they are exposed to through the media.  Rather 
than using the media to form an accurate, informed opinion, the mass public uses media inputs to 
decide how they ought to feel on a given issue.  The central notion in dividing the capacities of 
the two publics to engage in policy could be thought of as information asymmetry; this is the 
common thread running through traditionalist theories of public opinion.  The ignorance and 
irrational tendencies of the mass public are balanced somewhat by the much smaller, but still 
influential, attentive public.  The composition of the attentive public falls somewhere between 
policymakers, academics, influential elites, and the mass public.  These are the members of 
society who make it their business to be informed about security policy.  They form reasoned 
opinions and provide a stabilizing force in the arena of public discourse. 
In a transition spanning the last three or four decades, the traditionalists have largely been 
replaced by revisionist theories.  The guiding principles of the traditionalist paradigm were 
increasingly viewed as prohibitively pessimistic concerning the cognitive competency of the 
general public.  Among the most compelling early revisionist publications came in the 1970s and 
called into question the methodology of the prominent traditionalist scholars.
69
  These early 
critiques focused primarily on the structure and implementation of survey projects used to 
portray the mass public as ignorant and capricious.  A common flaw in these surveys was a 
failure to recognize and minimize instances of question bias.  The emphasis of the traditionalist 
perspective on the acquisition of raw information in the decision making process, resulted in a 
heavy emphasis on survey questions requiring subject-specific knowledge.  In the revisionist 
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view, the absence of advanced academic work or policy experience in the security field should 
not be considered prerequisite to the formation of relevant opinion amongst the general public.  
Two prominent publications in the 1980s advanced the revisionist claim that although survey 
data can be interpreted to show a divide between the opinions of the mass public and elites, the 
conclusion should not be that the mass public is incorrect.
70
  A more recent study from the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) reinforced the conclusions of earlier works with a 
data set spanning nearly a decade.  The CCFR publication acknowledges gaps between public 
opinion and elites, but where traditionalist literature attributes these gaps to the ignorance of the 
public and the comparative wisdom of elites, the gaps are now explained by analyzing disparities 
between the values, goals, and interests of the two groups.
71
   
The most important facet to the revisionist perspective is the understanding that members 
of the public need not have all the facts on a given policy in order to have a relevant opinion.
72
  
Although a certain amount of information is necessary to make an informed decision, Lupia and 
McCubbins present an analysis that highlights the ability of individuals to discern which 
information is most useful when it is presented to them.  They place value on the ability to ignore 
or forget information.  Rather than being able articulate a thoughtful opinion on the more 
nuanced aspects of security policy, it is more important that a member of the public be able to 
understand the likely consequences of a policy as they apply to their interests.  By distinguishing 
between the sort of decision burden elites face, and the lesser burden of the public, it becomes 
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less important that the two groups demonstrate equal subject knowledge.  Extending upon these 
differing standards, it is helpful to consider James Surowiecki’s work on collective judgments, 
and his four part characterization of a “wise” public.73  First is information diversity, which 
requires that public beliefs be grounded in at least some fundamental understanding of all 
relevant issue factors, including a basic technical understanding.  The second category, 
independence, requires that individuals are not pressured to conform to a particular belief.  Third, 
decentralization requires that individuals be able to consider local and personal experiences.  
Finally, aggregation accounts for the importance of being able to synthesize policies or 
collective decisions using the assorted individual judgments.  Surowiecki’s analysis is more 
restrictive than most revisionists, indeed its emphasis on information diversity seems to draw 
from the traditionalist perspective, but the purpose of the four categories is different from most 
revisionist projects.  In Surowiecki’s text the four categories are discussed in terms of 
“correctness” rather than simply appropriateness or legitimacy as you might find in similar 
publications.  The four categories describe the conditions that must be met in order for the mass 
public to produce an actionable policy, whereas revisionists like Page and Barabas from the 
CCFR project focused on the ability of individuals to make judgments based on their own 
distinct values and goals, rather than those of the state more generally.   
In their 2006 publication, Herron and Jenkins-Smith provide a summary of the five 
axioms of revisionist theory.  The first axiom is a point we have already discussed; a complete 
knowledge set is not a prerequisite for making valuable policy choices.  Belief systems (such as 
liberalism, realism, or rationalism) serve to both support and constrain mass publics in the same 
way elite discourse relies on them to provide coherence and consistency, but a nuanced 
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understanding of them is not required.  Short term variances in mass opinion should not be taken 
as changes in preferences because long-term data shows a greater degree of consistency.  In the 
short run, while members of the mass public may use belief systems and heuristics adopted from 
elite policy debates, data shows that over the long run public beliefs influence government 
behavior.  Finally, although it can be demonstrated that the mass public relies heavily on 
personal values, goals, and interests, it should not be assumed that the public is incapable of 
appreciating certain general public interests.  Although this system of axioms is drawn from 
studies using mostly the American public, many of the general conclusions can be applied to our 
study of the Middle East, and will inform to the structure and operations of a track-II coalition 
articulated in the following section.  In making the shift towards the Middle East, the most 
helpful analysis of public opinion is provided by Daniel Yankelovick.
74
 
Yankelovick’s revisionist perspective concerns democratic publics, but provides a useful 
means of distinguishing between “good” and “bad” public judgments.  Yankelovick first 
provides a definition for “quality,” which provides a basis for distinguishing between good and 
bad.  The quality of public opinion is good “when the public accepts responsibility for the 
consequences of its views” and it is bad “when the public, for whatever reason, is unprepared to 
do so.”75  Two additional defining characteristics include the firmness with which an individual 
adheres to a judgment, and the degree to which a given judgment contradicts the values 
expressed by judgments in related issue areas.
76
  The value of Yankelovick’s approach is in 
placing the quality determiner on what an individual does with the knowledge they possess, 
rather than how much knowledge they possess.  Even among revisionists, few have done this so 
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effectively as Yankelovick.  The driving forces behind this approach are observations in which 
the expression of public opinion has failed to account for likely consequences.  Two of the 
examples from Yankelovick’s text are especially useful.  In a 1986 news poll, 65 percent of 
respondents said they were in favor of a constitutional amendment that would require Congress 
to balance the budget annually.  When later questions included the stipulation that balancing the 
budget would likely require increased federal taxes, favorability dropped to 39 percent.  In 
another example, specifically related to security policy, Yankelovick reviews public sentiments 
directly following the taking of US hostages by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.  The vehemence 
with which some members of the public responded, using phrases like “nuke ‘em,” was an 
instance of bad public judgment.  In a third example, from Herron and Jenkins-Smith in their 
analysis of public opinion and the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, we again see the 
consideration of repercussions in polling data.  When polled, 53 percent of American’s voiced 
support for expanding the size and ensuring the technical superiority of the existing nuclear 
arsenal.  However, when it was included that such an expansion would require additional nuclear 
testing, the percentage in favor dropped to 41 percent.
77
  Each of these examples illustrate 
Yankelovich’s framework for distinguishing between qualities of public expression.   
The two examples using polling data above are helpful in considering Yankelovich’s 
maturation process of public opinion, which is furthermore a helpful explanation of the 
sometimes erratic behavior of the public.  While other revisionists typically rely on a critique of 
survey methodologies to explain the traditionalist understanding of the capricious public, 
Yankelovich introduces three stages of public opinion development.  First is the consciousness 
raising stage, in which a policy is introduced to the public arena.  Second is the working through 
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stage.  As its name suggests, this describes the time when the public is considering how to judge 
a particular policy or circumstance and how it fits with their existing beliefs.  Finally, in the 
resolution stage, the public settles on a particular set of interpretations and judgments.  At this 
point the public is able to produce “good” public judgments.78 
Although Yankelovich largely dismisses the relevance of ideology and culture by 
emphasizing the public’s understanding of ends, one of the prominent critiques of his work, there 
is still room to consider the important inputs that might inform how policy ends are evaluated by 
the public.  Perhaps the most fundamental and influential input is the individual’s perception of 
their demographic status, allowing them to evaluate how a policy will affect their life.
79
  Also 
fundamental to the individual’s perceptions are their political beliefs as informed by ideology.  
As mentioned above, Yankelovich attempts to remove ideology entirely, taking the position that 
judgments heavily informed by ideology distort the logical consideration of repercussions.  This 
idealistic account of public opinion denies the possibility of subjective divergence from a 
judgment that is assumed in Yankelovich’s assessment to be objectively good.  Although 
Yankelovich’s approach is the most useful under most conditions, we must accept that 
circumstances exist in which ideology plays an important role in making policy judgments, and 
that it is right for it do so.
80
  Similar to the core beliefs encompassed by ideology, “domain 
perceptions” are perspectives that apply to a particular area of policy.81  Lastly, as a subdivision 
of domain perceptions are beliefs specific to individual policies.
82
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A more difficult question to answer than how public opinion is formed is how public 
opinion comes to inform policymaking.  As with the preponderance of literature on the subject, 
most analyses rely on American polling data and election records, or those from other Western, 
liberal democracies.  It is my objective here to provide both a useful perspective on comparing 
democratic governing structures with undemocratic structures with regard to public influence on 
policy, and then to describe the range of activities accessible to various publics in their 
interaction with policymaking elites. 
The common understanding of public-government interaction in liberal societies 
emphasizes the importance of the democratic process.  However, when public opinion 
development and communication is broken down into its component parts, the process of 
electing government representation is at best secondary to the role of lobbying and other activist 
projects coordinated by NGOs.  Rather than thinking of government liberalism in terms of 
elections, it is a more accurate reflection of the liberal policymaking apparatus to think in terms 
of the degree to which the public can engage in policy dialogue and apply social pressure.  While 
impending elections will make elected officials more sensitive to public pressure, the role of 
regular elections is similar in effect to an active protest culture in undemocratic systems, 
although the latter is less consistent.  It is also worth noting that the culture-producing effect of 
public engagement in policymaking through track-II programs is both similar to, and may be a 
precursor to, the culture-production of elections.  Understanding the relationship between public 
opinion and policy makers in these terms allows us to draw more useful comparisons between 
the research done in liberal societies, and the future of Middle Eastern politics.  In other words, 
where political cultures and governing systems operate differently, parallels may exist between 
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publics and how individuals formulate their opinions, and the means through which they 
influence their respective governments. 
 
 
 
In order to better evaluate the interaction between publics and governments, I have 
identified a range of five activities in the realm of public expression, as portrayed in figure 4.  
The first level, furthest to the left of the diagram, includes only the most violent activities, often 
with malicious intentions, which accounts for everything from outright revolt, to vandalism, to 
insurgency.  This level of analysis includes only the most extreme cases of violent public 
expression.  The second level is violent protest.  The line between revolt and violent protest is 
fine, and the former may evolve into the latter.  The third level is peaceful protest.  For example, 
consider the Egyptian protests during the winter of 2010.  While there were violent acts 
perpetrated by some members of these protests, the movement as a hole was peaceful and was 
not characterized by violent conflict with the entrenched authority.  I refer to the fourth level as 
“institutional activism.”  Public engagement efforts in this category are lead and facilitated by 
NGOs.  In the earlier review of NGO activities in the Middle East, many of the projects listed 
would fall into this category.  However, it is important to recognize that within this category 
there are varying degrees of interaction between the NGO managers and the public they 
Figure 4: The scale presents a variety of means for 
public expression, ranging from most extreme on 
the left, to the most liberal on the right.  Although 
activities on the left can be present in varying 
degrees of liberal and authoritarian societies, note 
that those on the right are only accessible in liberal 
societies. 
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represent, hence the subdivision of the category between activism by elites, and representative 
activism.  As contact with the public increases, the activity moves nearer to the fifth level, 
broadly identified as “liberal activism.”  These sorts of activities include examples such as 
petition projects and letter-writing campaigns.  Liberal activism entails a high degree of 
individual autonomy and freedom of political expression. 
In considering NGO projects in the Middle East, the most important goal should be to 
broaden public accessibility to more levels along the spectrum, while diminishing reliance on 
those forms of public expression furthest to the left.  Note that protest is generally a healthy 
political activity, and the maintenance of a protest culture in the Middle East need not be to the 
exclusion of more liberal forms of political expression.  Broadening the means of public 
expression will increase the legitimacy of public opinion, and eventually facilitate a healthy 
relationship between the mass public and government, with the NGO community as an 
intermediary.  Under the status quo, one of the greatest struggles faced by NGOs is the 
communication of their goals and activities to the mass public.  This failure becomes problematic 
when in cases such as the Search for Common Ground project in 1993, where media and mass 
public reactions brought about the collapse of an otherwise promising policy dialogue.  If a 
coalition of NGOs is going to be any more successful than the existing dispersal of independent 
NGO projects, it must improve public relations across the region.  Even moderate success in this 
endeavor will provide an improved public foundation for regional reconciliation and cooperation 
than exists today. 
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Part III: The Goals, Structure, and Encumbrances of a Track-II Coalition 
 Track II v. Track I 
 
In beginning the discussion of a possible track II coalition, addressing its participants, 
goals, and structure, it is helpful to outline why the unofficial option is more favorable at this 
juncture than the more commonly proposed official approaches.  To start, in the existing 
scholarship on the subject, some of the most notable authors have suggested that further track II 
activities could be beneficial in the development of positive security relations in the region.
83
  In 
fact, Spiegel opened a recent publication on Middle East security by acknowledging that track II 
projects may be the most appropriate option for the international community given the current 
regional climate.
84
  He later recognizes that it may be necessary to “develop an informal, even at 
times unofficial, structure to maintain ongoing discussions, build confidence, and at a minimum 
discuss disagreements.”85  Unfortunately, neither Spiegel nor Jones provides more than a 
sentence or two on the subject, and to the extent they clarify their track II recommendations, the 
emphasis is functionally the same as their track I proposals.  They do not avail themselves of the 
flexibility, influence, and public engagement which can be achieved through an unofficial effort. 
 The most important advantage in pursuing a track II solution as compared to an official 
regime is the ability to cultivate security and diplomatic norms.  Much of the literature on Middle 
East security finds that the creation of a security regime, with a robust network of CSBM, will 
propagate norms between regional governments.  Comparisons to precedent-setting regimes in 
other regions, such as ASEAN, support this conclusion.  However, the second half of the 
twentieth century and first decade of the twenty-first have time and again showed an 
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unwillingness amongst regional governments to settle on the terms of an inclusive regional 
organization.  The issues network in the Middle East is such that too many competing interests 
have prevented the development of consensus to the extent required for the first steps in creating 
a regime.  Fortunately, NGOs do not have the same restrictions on who they partner with.  The 
potential risks of participating in an unofficial coalition are rarely prohibitive, and in many cases, 
participation would be complimentary to the collective missions of the various NGOs.  For 
example, a partnership between The Search for Common Ground and the Cooperative 
Monitoring Center would combine their respective expertise in political resolution and defense 
policy to better facilitate dialogue on security issues.  Through the success of NGO partnerships, 
there is an increased likelihood that a new political culture could emerge among political elites.  
This development would better prepare the region for the establishment of an official security 
regime.  Without the track II coalition, academics and policy analysts can only sit and hope that 
political conditions shift in favor of their regime designs. 
 Political and economic conditions, as one of the greatest barriers to the creation of a 
security regime, would likely require reform before an official regime could take hold.
86
  In most 
proposals, and for most international precedents, these reforms are agreed upon by member 
countries prior to formally becoming members to the regime.  As states meet these agreed upon 
requirements by the founding states they become eligible for entry.  An unofficial coalition 
provides a forum for pursuing these reforms and building consensus around appropriate 
standards.  Not only does the track II approach provide a forum for developing reforms to create 
a foundation for a security regime, but NGOs by their nature are better positioned to work with 
public interests, such as a growing business community that would support economic and 
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political reformation.  Spiegel points out that the expanding regional business community, 
emerging just in the last few decades, has increasingly favored reconciliation in the region 
because they want better access to regional and global markets.  An unofficial coalition could 
work with these interests to mutual advantage, while for these private entities it would be more 
difficult to interact with an official regime. 
 Perhaps the most obvious advantage of an unofficial coalition is the irrelevance of the 
prohibitive concerns felt by governments entering into international arrangements.  The three 
barriers to the creation of a security regime identified earlier, political and economic stability, 
and the potential for balance of power rivalries, have no bearing on NGOs.  In addition to these 
three broad scale barriers, progress in the Middle East is often slowed by the competition of 
issues.  Recall for instance the earlier discussion of the ACRS process, which while at first 
appearing promising, was eventually derailed by an overemphasis on Israel and Palestine lead by 
Egyptian representatives.  The bureaucratic slowness inherent in any official international 
organization renders efforts open to this sort of failure.  While it stands to reason that NGOs will 
be likely to collaborate because of their overlapping missions, they will maintain a great degree 
of independence within the coalition.  The flexibility of an unofficial organization will allow the 
coalition to undertake, as they already do, a variety of issues simultaneously between different 
groupings of coalition members and different focus states.  The failure to resolve one issue will 
not cripple ongoing efforts with different issues, while progress in one area could still potentially 
benefit another.  As issues are resolved in this piecemeal fashion, the barriers preventing states 
from entering a new regime under the status quo would gradually be reduced.  The easing of 
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tensions in this manner will open the way for the pressure of overlapping strategic interests and 
domestic and public pressures to move the region towards a sustainable official regime.
87
 
 
Goals 
 
The overarching goal of a track II coalition in the Middle East is to establish a regional 
network capable of providing a foundation for the development of an official security regime.  
This process would occur in three stages.  The first stage is of course the establishment of the 
NGO network.  Building from the successes of an integrated NGO community, it will eventually 
be possible to establish a security forum for regional governments.  This would be a centralized 
institution acknowledged by as many states as possible as a forum for the resolution of disputes.  
The final stage will be the establishment of a centrally organized institution that will eventually 
resemble the institutional structure of ASEAN.  This organization could develop subordinate 
working groups for each region, a regional court for adjudicating disputes, and an assortment of 
offices responsible for specific policy areas.  Recall the four categories of regimes introduced in 
the beginning of Part II: legal, restrictive, cooperative, and allied.  When considering the 
coalition itself, it would obviously fall outside any of the categories presented earlier and 
represents the least-integrated form of regime possible.  As the coalition evolves it will gradually 
increase participants, both NGOs and governments.  The first step beyond a track-II coalition 
will likely be a legal regime having to do with either environmental or economic policy.  Success 
in later stages of regime development will the success of existing efforts on more contentious 
policies, such as those undertaken by CWCC to promote the universality of the Chemical 
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Weapons Convention.  With regionally inclusive CSBMs as a foundation, the creation of a 
restrictive or cooperative regime will become increasingly likely. 
The primary force at work in the progression between the three stages is the diffusion of 
norms.  Recall the discussion of the norm “lifecycle” from Finnemore and Sikkink.  This 
understanding of norm development moves between norm emergence, realignment, norm 
cascade, and internalization.  The activities sponsored by the members of the track-II coalition 
are the points of emergence for the new diplomatic and security norms which will provide a 
foundation for improved regional relations in the long-run.  As norms spread between publics 
and elites, the process of realignment will occur in which government interests and behaviors 
shift to reflect the spreading norms.  In this sense, realignment would occur so that state interests 
overlay with projects facilitated by the coalition and treaties that have successfully implemented 
treaties.  Facilitating realignment, as a component of norm diffusion, is one of the central 
functions of the coalition.  Following the potentially lengthy realignment process, a norm 
cascade will occur among newly aligned governments, after which, the broad internalization of 
norms will create an environment conducive to the creation of a robust and inclusive security 
regime. 
As discussed in the section addressing security norms, norm diffusion can be supported 
through civil society interactions with governments, publics, and other civil society institutions.  
The primary operating goal that should dictate both the types of projects the coalition undertakes 
and the manner in which they pursue them is the diffusion of favorable norms and the 
development of a healthy regional political culture.  Diplomatic and security norms will diffuse 
through elite interactions and public engagement (recall figure three) and in some instances be 
codified in bilateral and multilateral agreements.  These activities are considered CSBMs under 
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the definition from Intriligator, introduced in Part II.  Under this understanding of CSBMs, it is 
worthwhile to promote not only military engagement, but also political and economic 
engagement in the form of bilateral or multilateral partnerships on issues of shared importance.  
For example, some members of the coalition could work to engage regional partners in dialogue 
concerning possible solutions to the annual water shortages faced across the region.  
Environmental policy is not often included in a list of potentially fruitful CSBMs, however, as a 
shared regional concern, if effectively integrated into a regional approach, environmental policy 
stands to provide a catalyst for norm diffusion that is as effective as traditional alternatives.  
The development of new policies through cooperation between coalition partners and 
between governments should, of course, be a part of the coalition’s operating plan, but it should 
not be the primary goal.  These policy discussions should be thought of as a catalyst for 
developing cooperative relationships, regardless of the outcome of specific dialogues.  Most 
importantly, the success and failure of the coalition should not be judged based solely on the 
number of successful policies its projects produce (although successful policies will be an 
indicator that the broader goal of norm diffusion is progressing).  If track II projects result in new 
policies, it should be thought of as a positive byproduct of the coalition’s operation. 
A final goal of the coalition is to improve the quality of public opinion.  This goal is 
central to the public engagement mission of the coalition.  Recall Yankelovich’s emphasis on an 
appropriate consideration of ends in the formation of “good” public judgments.  Yankelovich 
provides a framework for determining the validity of an opinion, where the practical implications 
of his perspective require improved educational programs to more effectively and accurately 
convey policy.  By engaging in educational programs the coalition will work to improve the 
quality of public opinion among mass publics, informed publics, and elites.  Like each of the 
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goals described in this section, this is an enormous undertaking that will require a great deal of 
time and collaboration within a broadly inclusive coalition. 
 
Structure and Function 
 
In this section it is helpful to recall Almond’s five components of society described at the 
end of Part II in the public opinion section: government, media, interest groups, the attentive 
public, the mass public.  It is also helpful to recall figure two, which presents a visualization of 
the interactions between the five components and the coalition.   
To begin the description of the coalition’s operating structure, we must consider the 
participants.  The NGOs and projects reviewed in the first section are representative of the types 
of organizations that would make up the composition of the coalition.  It is important to have a 
diversity of institutions participating in order to maximize the effectiveness of the coalition as a 
whole.  Participants should include independent research centers, universities, businesses, think 
tanks, advocacy groups, and monitoring centers.  Although a significant majority of these groups 
ought to be based in the Middle East, it will be appropriate to involve international groups in 
order to access the breadth of expertise available in the international NGO community.  
Participants should not be limited to organizations with security-related missions.  The variety of 
policy issues peripherally relevant to security policy in the Middle East requires a depth and 
breadth of specialties be incorporated in the coalition.  The Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation, the AAAS, the CWCC, SIPRI, the Search for Common Ground, and the 
Cooperative Monitoring Center focus primarily on security issues, but from differing 
approaches.  The AAAS supports projects designed to build relationships in the scientific 
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community.  The Cooperative Monitoring Center trains military and political leadership in 
verification measures and technology supporting arms control treaties and an array of CSBM.  
The Search for Common Ground focuses its work on supporting negotiations between 
governments and building political relationships.  An expanded coalition would build on this 
foundation with organizations facilitating government-business relationships in the region and 
policy-specific organizations (refugees, resource scarcity, etc.).  Finally, the membership of the 
coalition must be drawn from as many states as possible, without too heavy a concentration in 
any one place.  It will be necessary to include participants from important peripheral states as 
well, such as Iran, Turkey, and possibly Pakistan and Afghanistan.  This will be the most 
challenging consideration in building the coalition. 
 It is unreasonable to expect upwards of one hundred private institutions to participate in a 
collaborative organization from the start, so the coalition will grow in stages, as described earlier 
in the Goals section.  This gradual process of increasing regional inclusivity will likely resemble 
something similar to the process undertaken by the CWCC, where with each event sponsored by 
the coalition they draw a larger assembly and increase their membership.  The most important 
first step is to establish a core assembly of participants from the region.  Ideally this would 
include participants from nearly all states in the region, but at least the key states: Israel, Syria, 
Egypt, and Iran.  These four states are typically identified as the key components to any 
sustainable regional solution.  The omission of any one of them would undermine the integrity of 
the coalition, and from a track II perspective it will be necessary to have NGOs based in these 
countries in order to facilitate cooperation with the government on policy issues and the eventual 
creation of an official regime.  This early group of NGOs would establish the guiding principles 
for the coalition, the organizational structure, and a plan for growth and development.  The 
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guiding principles of this organization must not explicitly exclude any governments or NGOs 
from participating in coalition projects. From this foundation, the coalition will gradually extend 
its membership to include more political ideologies and economic sectors in more countries.  In 
order to maintain representational balance across the region, it may be appropriate to restrict the 
number of participants allowed to join from a single country by creating a ratio quota.  For 
example, it may be acceptable for three Israeli participants and one Saudi Arabian participant to 
enter at the start, but before a fourth Israeli institution can enter the coalition, there must be 
increased representation from Saudi Arabia.  Alternatively, these quotas could be organized by 
region.  This approach would encourage sub-networks of NGOs from across the Middle East to 
collaborate and join the coalition at the same time, in order to maintain balanced representation.  
These specifics for managing growth would be articulated in the coalition’s guiding principles. 
 I divide the rest of the discussion of the structure and function of the coalition into two 
components reflecting the structure of the issues presented in this paper.  First is the function of 
the coalition as a norm-diffusion apparatus.  The coalition will create an environment to 
collaborate and discuss.  The projects undertaken by the coalition will be similar in structure to 
those reviewed earlier, and will involve dialogue between NGOs, between governments, and 
even between different departments of the same government.  One of the strengths of the 
coalition will be the ability to track participants in various projects and to build on the successes 
of previous projects.  Under the status quo, NGO projects primarily occur in isolation, so when 
they conclude or collapse, it is difficult to salvage the areas of the project in which progress was 
made.  For an example of where this sort of engagement would be beneficial, consider the 
bureaucratic cultures of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and the Israeli Defense Ministry as 
expressed in the ACRS proceedings.  By their behavior, it is clear the Egyptian Foreign Ministry 
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is inclined to adhere more nearly to international diplomatic and security norms, whereas the 
Israeli Defense Ministry favors “uncompromising self-reliance.”88  Further complicating matters, 
in the process of establishing the guiding principles in the ACRS process, while the two 
bureaucratic components of the Egyptian-Israeli policymaking apparatus had conflicting 
opinions, the negotiating leadership of the two countries expressed unified support.  Cases such 
as this are the reason the operations of the coalition should anticipate coordinating collaboration 
between branches and departments in the same government, in addition to their international 
projects. 
 By hosting these projects, and maintaining unprecedented continuity and collaboration 
between projects, the coalition will enable regional elites to develop a rapport.  Incidents such as 
in 1978, when Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin called the Egyptian Foreign Minister a 
“young man” during a meeting, would be more easily avoided.89  Although the Prime Minister’s 
intention was benign, the remark was considered condescending and after the Egyptian 
delegation departed it took months to reestablish a stable dialogue.  Increased encounters 
between elites will foster better relationships in the long run, especially if they are part of a 
sustained regional effort. 
 Much of this work will be manifest in the form of regular meetings, policy forums, and 
summits, each with varying degrees of public access and international inclusiveness.  As an 
organizational mechanism for these activities, the coalition should be organized around a Middle 
East Center for Cooperation.  Although it is possible the Center for Cooperation could be 
established with a single headquarters, it may be necessary to create multiple regional offices.  
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Location aside, the importance of the Center for Cooperation is as a central (institutionally, not 
necessarily geographically) hub for coordinating regional track II projects.  Much of the work 
undertaken by the Center for Cooperation would be divided between administrators at the 
various member organizations, at least until funding could be secured to found a separate 
institution, specifically tied to the coalition and operating in that central coordinating role.  The 
work of the Center for Cooperation should be conducted digitally in the early years of the 
coalition, especially if a central location is not identified. 
 Although in the context of a track II coalition a central coordinating hub like the Center 
for Cooperation is unique, the idea is drawn from the organization structure of existing security 
regimes and many of the proposals for a regime in the Middle East.  For instance, the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the coordinating body for the 
CWC.  The proposals for official regimes articulated by Evron and in the SIPRI report also call 
for central bodies for monitoring, coordination, dialogue, and enforcement.
90
  Most nearly related 
to the proposal for the Middle East Center for Cooperation is the regional security institute 
described by Spiegel.
91
  The security institute would provide NGO input on issues under 
discussion through official government negotiations. 
 The second component to the operations of the coalition relates to public opinion and the 
ability of NGOs to engage with and respond to the public.  It is helpful here to recall figure two, 
which depicts the ways in which NGOs interact with the various components of the public.  On 
this subject, operations must necessarily be bidirectional; the coalition should work to express 
public sentiments to governments, while also serving an educational role in their projects 
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involving the public.  In both types of projects, consider Yankelovich’s interpretation of public 
judgments; it will be important to refine public opinion to improve the quality of public 
judgments in order to make the expression of these judgments more compelling for government 
elites. 
 In 2000, Yasser Arafat refused to negotiate at Camp David because he perceived a 
significant opposition from the Palestinian public.  He cited the growing popularity of Hamas 
and the Islamic Jihad as reasons for not making concessions in negotiations with Israel.
92
  It is 
easy to dismiss Arafat’s behavior as ploy to strengthen his bargaining position.  While in some 
instances this may be the case, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, to categorically dismiss 
appeals to public pressure would be overly cynical.  Political officials feel the pressures of public 
opinion in a variety of ways, not at all limited to democratic elections.  Under the status quo, the 
two most common expressions of public opinion in the Middle East are nonviolent and violent 
protest.  The coalition would be positioned to provide an additional channel of communication.  
NGOs will be able to coordinate domestic survey initiatives to better evaluate public opinion on 
regional security issues.  As part of a coalition, NGOs will be uniquely able to gather data from a 
variety of regional publics.  One of the most challenging aspects to evaluating Middle East 
public opinion is the dearth of reliable data, so this function of the coalition will be tremendously 
valuable to analysts and policy makers.  As the coalition matures, is recognized by more 
governments, and increases its work with the public, it will be possible to assist in coordinating 
petition campaigns.  Petitions can be an excellent tactic in conveying public opinion.  Similar 
efforts already exist through social media outlets, but they are organizationally weak and often 
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unfocused.  The coalition could provide legitimacy to these public activities and increase their 
effectiveness. 
 As the coalition will include research institutions in its membership, the coalition stands 
to make significant contributions to public opinion research beyond the limited confines of 
conveying public opinion to governments.  In this sort of research endeavor, it is important to 
recall Surowiecki’s four components in the correct interpretation of public opinion: information 
diversity, independence, decentralization, and aggregation.  As previously discussed, public 
opinion research in the Middle East is hampered by the lack of reliable data (i.e. non-government 
sources).  Of particular interest is the ability to better gauge the divides in public opinion 
between interest groups, cultures, age groups, geographical locations, and by socioeconomic 
status.  The hope is that over time it will be possible to reproduce the sort of research provided 
by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, used earlier in reference to public decision-making 
and the role played by ideology in formulating public opinion.  The structure of the coalition 
makes it the ideal entity for this sort of research as it meets with each of Surowiecki’s four 
criteria.  Undertaking this sort of work in the Middle East will both enhance the general 
understanding of public opinion, specifically as it relates to foreign policy, and it will help guide 
the educational programs sponsored by the coalition. 
 In addition to gauging public opinion, it is important that accurate information also flow 
in the opposite direction.  To this effect, the coalition should host educational programs on all 
issues in which they engage.  In reviewing track II projects since they came into their prime in 
the 1990s, it becomes clear that this is both one of the most important functions of an NGO 
project, and one of the worst executed.  Most educational programs are intended for elite 
education; that is, academics, policymakers, etc.  While these high level programs will still serve 
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a purpose, they are no substitute for public engagement.  Recall the stages of track II operations 
from Part I: socialization, filtering, and policy inaction.  As identified earlier, the filtering 
process is usually where track II projects encounter the most problems.  Traditionally, the 
filtering stage involves conveying the results of track II discussion from the isolated group of 
direct participants to their constituent governments.  This version of filtering must be expanded 
in order to engage the public.  The composition of the coalition should enable its various 
members to develop a balanced account of security issues which are too often mired in rhetoric 
and hyperbole.  Media outreach, public forums, and pamphleting movements will serve as the 
mechanisms for public education.  The success of these projects will help improve the quality of 
public judgments, which have been stunted in some places by state media and an overabundance 
of rhetorical expression.   
 With regard to public expression, part of the purpose of the coalition should be to move 
the manner of interaction between publics and governments from the bottom of the scale, nearer 
to the top (recall the five-tier account from before).  Rather than resorting to violence, especially 
when the resort to violence is a fringe behavior and can delegitimize similarly minded peaceful 
activities, it should be possible to gradually work towards conditioning publics and governments 
to interact through peaceful means of public discourse.  Much of this behavior would be 
empowered through democratic processes, but the existence of democracy should not be taken as 
a precondition. 
While one of the primary functions of the coalition is to coordinate activities with 
regional governments, it is worth considering the manner in which extra-regional governments 
should be permitted to participate, particularly with regard to Western governments.  Many 
NGOs in the ME already have connections with the West.  However, Western officials should be 
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limited in their ability to participate in the early stages of the coalition development.  As the 
coalition develops, and a regionally representative group of states decides to participate, it will 
be possible to incorporate the limited involvement of western officials.  Ideally, extra regional 
governments will only become involved when the coalition is strong enough, and has the favor 
and participation of enough regional governments, that serious talks can begin around an official 
regional security regime.  At that stage it is not unusual to have extra regional stake holders 
become involved, if only to voice their support for the principles of the emerging regime.  At the 
unofficial level, this sort of involvement would be less constructive as the primary goal of the 
coalition is to engage with regional publics and build relationships between regional elites.  
Foreign governments would have little to contribute, and their involvement would be more likely 
to derail early progress than to advance regional cooperation.  This represents a significant 
divergence from the norms of the field; most considerations of Middle East security involve 
highly integrated participation from either the United States or European Governments.  The 
difference of opinion is explained by the difference in approach.  The types of participants in a 
track II coalition with the goals articulated above are necessarily different from those participants 
typically considered by isolated track II projects or official negotiating processes.  The early 
stages of the coalition are intended for building regional relationships, and extra-regional 
influences are neither necessary nor conducive to achieving this goal. 
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Barriers to Success 
 
The evolution of the proposed coalition will not go unopposed.  A prime example of 
overt interference was on display in late 2011 when Egyptian Security Forces halted the 
operations of 17 NGOs.
93
  This sort of government interference will certainly continue in many 
parts of the region.  As the coalition develops, some projects will set it at odds with certain 
governments, particularly projects having to do with public engagement.  It is likely that some 
coalition members will be prohibited from operating for periods of time, or will cease to exist 
entirely.  This is of course a challenge already faced by many NGOs in the region, especially 
those working on security-related issues.  As members of a coalition, with the support of at least 
some regional governments, it can be hoped that NGOs will be less likely to face restrictions by 
governments.  This problem will be most pronounced in the early stages of development, but as 
the coalition grows, becomes better established, and gains regional support and representation, it 
will become increasingly difficult for governments to abuse NGO coalition members. 
Government restrictions on NGOs are not necessarily overt.  The efforts of the COE to 
promote citizenship rights in Europe involved collaboration between both governments and 
NGOs.  In the case of Russian involvement addressed earlier in Part II, the Moscow School of 
Political Studies was one of the few NGOs permitted to participate in COE forums and 
workshops.
94
  However, after participating in these projects, the Moscow School was often shut 
out by the government and prevented from contributing to the policymaking process.  This sort 
of barrier, although less overt, is in some ways more pernicious and threatening to the success of 
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the coalition.  Although the coalition will be able to pursue new collaborative research efforts 
and advocacy programs, their long term success is dependent on their ability to work with 
regional governments.  Recall the remainder of Checkel’s case study on the COE and the 
diffusion of citizenship norms.  Given the changing governance conditions in parts of the Middle 
East, there is little to gain from trying to fit regional governments into Checkel’s categories (state 
over society, statist, corporatist, and liberal).  However, we can safely acknowledge that the 
region presents an array of states along the spectrum, although heavily concentrated on the statist 
end.  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the variances within each section should be taken into 
consideration.  For instance, between two statist societies, one may have a particularly influential 
commercial industry with greater access to government officials than their domestic 
counterparts.  Alternatively, instead of influential business elites, an example nearer to the 
circumstances faced in Russia could exist; an institution for higher education may be positioned 
to gain better access to members of the government than the likely limited NGO community.  
These considerations are important because they make clear the necessity of maintaining a 
diverse membership in the coalition.  Some approaches will be successful in one country, but 
different circumstances leave them fruitless in others. 
Of the many logistical concerns a new coalition will face, the most potentially damaging 
is the identification of funding sources.  The startup costs of the coalition should be moderate, 
considering it will consist mostly of agreeing with other Middle East organizations on terms of 
collaboration and resource-sharing.  As the coalition develops it will be necessary to identify 
additional funding sources to support the expanded projects.  Returning to the Egypt example, of 
the 17 NGOs affected, two were based in the United States and were funded by Congress with 
the mission of monitoring democratic processes and promoting democratic values 
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internationally.  In this instance, the source of funding for the two NGOs influenced how they 
were perceived by the government.  Among the NGO projects operating in the Middle East 
today, many are supported by Western governments.  For instance, the CWCC is currently 
pursuing funding from a number of European governments to support an upcoming summit in 
the Middle East.  The Coalition must be cognizant of their funding support, and how funding 
sources can inform both public and government perception of their activities. 
The final barrier worth mentioning is the potential for government participation to 
gradually diminish as the coalition grows.  As mentioned previously, the primary concern of the 
coalition is to facilitate dialogue and engage regional publics in security policy for the purpose of 
norm propagation and the improvement of public opinion.  However, it must be noted that if the 
coalition persists in the absence of some display of concrete achievements, government 
willingness to participate may fade.  Of the critiques included in this section this is the least 
worrisome, primarily because government officials are largely accustomed to getting very little 
accomplished, but also because the scope of the envisioned coalition will almost certainly obtain 
concrete policies in the tertiary areas of economics and the environment. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 When track-II projects in the Middle East have occurred over the last two decades they 
function almost identically as their official counterparts, especially in cases where government 
representatives are present.  Because they operate the same way, these projects are vulnerable to 
the same weaknesses inherent in government relations.  State interests and entrenched rhetoric 
keep governments in the Middle East apart.  Track-II programs ought to be able to capitalize 
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more effectively on what makes them fundamentally different from official government 
programs; NGOs are not restricted by state interests, their current operations show a willingness 
to engage across the region, and their work makes an effort to transcend debilitating state 
rhetoric.  In order to better realize the potential of these attributes it is necessary to forge a 
coalition of NGO partners that is regionally inclusive and that can lay a foundation for a future of 
stable government relations. 
With such a variety of NGOs working in the Middle East, many of them with overlapping 
or complimentary missions, the only remaining question is why NGOs have not become better 
integrated already.  To a large extent, this can be explained by the barriers to NGO projects 
identified at the end of Part II.  However, as was also explained, by collaborating NGOs may 
mitigate some of the risks of acting independently.  A more likely and more frustrating 
explanation is that the right people in the NGO community have yet to try. 
 The driving force behind this paper was dissatisfaction with existing literature evaluating 
track II projects, and perhaps even more so, the literature analyzing prospects for developing 
official Middle East security regimes.  In the case of the former, contributors time and again 
identify the importance of altering the status quo security culture through track II projects, but 
then fall short of suggesting a proposal that would provide the longevity and consistency 
required do something as massively challenging as altering the political culture of an entire 
region.  In the case of the latter, contributors call upon the spreading of “norms” and “culture” to 
explain the importance of some future security regime, but they do not adequately acknowledge 
the integral role of such norms in the establishment of a security regime.  This paper is an 
attempt to address these shortcomings by providing a short-term recommendation for how to 
influence the long-term future of Middle East security. 
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